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The Constitutional Tort System
NOAH SMITH-DRELICH*
Constitutional torts—private lawsuits for constitutional wrongdoing—are the
primary means by which violations of the U.S. Constitution are vindicated and
deterred. Through damage awards, and occasionally injunctive relief, victims of
constitutional violations discourage future misconduct while obtaining redress.
However, the collection of laws that governs these actions is a complete muddle,
lacking any sort of coherent structure or unifying theory. The result is too much and
too little constitutional litigation, generating calls for reform from across the
political spectrum along with reverberations that reach from Standing Rock to Flint
to Ferguson.
This Article constructs a framework of the constitutional tort system, drawing on
contemporary tort scholarship’s rich theorization of a similar set of challenges that
emerge in the private law context. By framing constitutional litigation as part of an
essentially tort-like system, in which the law seeks to facilitate deterrence and
compensation without unduly burdening state action, this Article presents an
analytical lens that clarifies, challenges, and transforms the law of constitutional
torts.
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Scholars Workshop for all of their advice and help with this Article.
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INTRODUCTION
Qualified immunity is under attack. A growing chorus of voices has questioned
whether the doctrine, one of the cornerstones of constitutional tort law, may go too
far in its drive to protect risk-averse public officials from personal liability. In the
words of its critics, qualified immunity instantiates a regime of “heads government
wins, tails plaintiff loses,”1 depriving plaintiffs whose rights have been violated of
redress while undermining a crucial tool for “ensur[ing] accountability and
professionalism in law enforcement.”2 This is especially a problem for members of

1. Cole v. Carson, 935 F.3d 444, 471 (5th Cir. 2019) (Willett, J., dissenting).
2. Qualified Immunity: The Supreme Court’s Unlawful Assault on Civil Rights and
Police Accountability, CATO INST. (Mar. 1, 2018), https://www.cato.org/events/qualifiedimmunity-supreme-courts-unlawful-assault-civil-rights-police-accountability [https://
perma.cc/U9P8-Y3ZT]; accord Emma Andersson, When Your Constitutional Rights Are
Violated but You Lose Anyway, ACLU (July 11, 2018, 4:45 PM), https://www.aclu.org/blog
/criminal-law-reform/when-your-constitutional-rights-are-violated-you-lose-anyway
[https://perma.cc/L5LM-N2U9].
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politically marginalized communities, who rely on the powerfully
countermajoritarian force of private lawsuits when confronting official misconduct.3
Yet in the face of these concerns, the Supreme Court has stood firm, doubling down
on the strict applicability of qualified immunity: effective governance and policing
cannot be sacrificed, not even in service of the rights and liberties enshrined in the
U.S. Constitution.4 The result is an uneasy impasse, in which qualified immunity’s
supporters argue that the doctrine’s application continues to fall short of adequately
protecting government officials, while qualified immunity’s detractors condemn its
severe limitation on the compensation and vindication of constitutional wrongdoing.
Taking these respective concerns seriously, qualified immunity may facilitate too
much and too little constitutional litigation. How can this be?
The answer to this puzzle, this Article posits, may be found by looking beyond
qualified immunity to the confused and constricted approach taken throughout the
laws governing private lawsuits for constitutional violations more generally.
Unmoored from any broader theoretical foundation, the laws of constitutional torts,
as these suits are most commonly labeled, have developed in a haphazard and largely
siloed fashion. The vigorous debate over the need for qualified immunity, for
example, seemingly exists in a world without § 1988, an attorney fee-shifting
provision that greatly influences the amount of constitutional tort litigation that is
filed.5 The result is a “proliferation of inconsistent policies and arbitrary distinctions”
that “renders constitutional tort law functionally unintelligible.”6
This Article seeks to cut through this confusion by constructing a model of the
constitutional tort system, providing an analytical framework through which doctrine
can be shaped and evaluated. Rather than trying to assemble a theoretical model of
constitutional torts from scratch, this framework bridges the gap between
constitutional torts and their private law counterparts, building on contemporary tort
theory’s rich discussion of similar challenges arising in the private law context.
Indeed, the tension at the heart of much of constitutional tort doctrine—how to
robustly deter and compensate without chilling societally desirable action—has been
a central concern of tort scholarship for decades.7 Despite these similarities and their
shared historical roots,8 the field of constitutional torts largely disregards the field of
torts writ large, relying instead on a discordant collection of policy solutions
borrowed from the nineteenth century or crafted from whole cloth.9

3. See James F. Blumstein, Federalism and Civil Rights: Complementary and
Competing Paradigms, 47 VAND. L. REV. 1251, 1260 (1994).
4. See, e.g., City of Escondido v. Emmons, 139 S. Ct. 500, 504 (2019).
5. 42 U.S.C. § 1988 (2012); see infra Part II (examining, among other things, § 1988’s
powerful normative and positive impact on qualified immunity).
6. John C. Jeffries, Jr., The Liability Rule for Constitutional Torts, 99 VA. L. REV. 207,
208 (2013).
7. The instrumentalist view treats tort suits as tools for accomplishing goals like ensuring
compensation and deterrence. See infra Part I.
8. See, e.g., William Baude, Is Qualified Immunity Unlawful?, 106 CALIF. L. REV. 45,
54 (2018).
9. See, e.g., infra Part II. When courts do turn to the common law of torts, it is most
commonly to answer a discrete question, such as defining the scope of the underlying
constitutional right, see, e.g., Michael Wells, Constitutional Remedies, Section 1983 and the
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Explicitly framing constitutional torts as comprising a tort-like system yields
substantial payoffs. By clarifying the extent to which constitutional tort law is
essentially concerned with optimizing the effects of constitutional litigation—
balancing constitutional rights and liberties against the state’s interest in protection
and governance10—this framework highlights how crudely, and often inconsistently,
the collection of reforms used within constitutional tort law work toward such an
end.11 Qualified immunity, for example, seeks to limit the burden of the stress,
stigma, and financial costs of litigation on desirable state action. But it offers a binary
solution, immunity or no immunity, to a nonbinary problem: the stress, stigma, and
financial cost of litigation weigh on decision-making with varying degrees of
severity.12
This Article’s conceptual shift, moreover, reveals an additional problem in this
context, pervasive yet overlooked: bias. Unlike private law torts, constitutional torts
owe their very existence to the recognition that state decision-making may be
influenced by racial prejudice, religious animus, and other such invidious biases.
Section 1983, for example, was enacted as part of the Ku Klux Klan Act of 1871 in
response to widespread anti-African American hostility throughout the ranks of
government officials.13 Yet, in another move reflecting constitutional tort law’s
neglect of tort theory, constitutional torts have borrowed their primary deterrence
remedy—compensatory damage awards—from their private law counterparts with
no consideration of or accounting for this difference. Although state actors who are
biased will not be deterred from constitutional wrongdoing to the same extent as state
actors who are not, compensatory damages are determined by the nature of the
harm—a broken leg, a damaged camera, and so forth—rather than the reason for it.
And when bias acts on decision making, compensatory damages will therefore fail
to deter wrongdoing appropriately.
Finally, this Article’s framework is useful not only for identifying problems but
also for identifying solutions. Each of the doctrinal shortcomings and oversights
examined in this discussion relates to some failure to balance deterrence and
compensation against the need for effective policing and governance. The parallel
nature of these problems, highlighted by this Article’s analytical framing of
constitutional tort law, implies the possibility of a common solution. This Article
offers one such reform, adapted from similar proposals in the context of private law
torts: damage awards could be increased or decreased (via damage multipliers, caps,
or proportional liability) to account for any influence, like the stress of being sued or
the bias of state decisionmakers, that might skew the overall effect of the
constitutional tort system. Such a reform could provide a more finely tunable

Common Law, 68 MISS. L.J. 157 (1998) (collecting cases), rather than considering how the
overlapping rules governing these cases do or should work in conjunction with one another.
10. See infra Part II; cf. Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 231 (2009) (gesturing to the
importance of balance in this context without fully embracing optimal deterrence).
11. See, e.g., Jeffries, supra note 6, at 208.
12. See infra Part II (discussing qualified immunity, § 1988 attorney’s fees, and a number
of other examples of such problems).
13. 42 U.S.C. § 1983; Developments in the Law—Section 1983 and Federalism, 90 HARV.
L. REV. 1133, 1141–53 (1977); see also U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.
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mechanism for optimizing constitutional litigation, presenting an answer not only to
the policy problems associated with qualified immunity—increasingly recognized
across the political spectrum—but also to the challenges that arise from § 1988
attorney’s fees, indemnification, and a wide variety of additional doctrines and
practices in this context.
The stakes could not be much higher. Private suits for constitutional wrongdoing
have grown into a significant force, with tens of thousands of such cases filed each
year.14 Indeed, § 1983 inmate cases alone comprise over ten percent of all federally
filed cases.15 And as a result, constitutional tort law’s failures reach throughout
society; the problems identified by this Article’s framework impact not only policing
but also prisons, public schools, public health, public housing, and public planning.16
The consequences of these failures, moreover, are not evenly distributed. Politically
vulnerable populations and members of disfavored groups disproportionately bear
the brunt of constitutional tort law’s disfunction.17
This Article proceeds in four parts. Part I examines the applicability of
instrumentalism to constitutional torts, concluding that it is not only appropriate but
that it also represents the dominant mode of analysis currently used in this context.
Part II then builds and applies a tort-like instrumentalist framework for constitutional
torts, illustrating the importance of carefully balancing the competing interests
implicated by constitutional tort suits and the inadequacy of current doctrine. Part III
explores how this framework shines new light on bias’s influence on the
constitutional tort system, and bias’s threat to balance in this context. Finally, Part
IV introduces a novel solution to these problems: tailored damage awards present a
promising mechanism for facilitating a closer-to-optimal operation of constitutional
torts.
I. INSTRUMENTALISM AND CONSTITUTIONAL TORTS
In Monroe v. Pape, the Supreme Court rejuvenated § 1983, giving rise to the
modern constitutional tort suit.18 Since then, constitutional tort law has evolved in
fits and starts into its modern form: a patchwork of discrete rules bearing little in
common with one another.19 Although courts routinely gesture to the “common law
of torts” in this context, constitutional tort law does not resemble its private law

14. Federal Judicial Caseload Statistics 2019, U.S. CTS. (Mar. 31, 2019), https://www
.uscourts.gov/statistics-reports/federal-judicial-caseload-statistics-2019 [https://perma.cc
/3RJK-8B5Y].
15. Id.
16. Constitutional wrongdoing in the context of policing alone is no small issue; a 2011
Justice Department report estimated that forty million people had contact with the police in
2008 and that 776,000 people “experienced force or the threat of force by police at least once.”
CHRISTINE EITH & MATTHEW R. DUROSE, U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., CONTACTS BETWEEN POLICE
AND THE PUBLIC, 2008, at 11 (2011).
17. See, e.g., Blumstein, supra note 3, at 1260.
18. 365 U.S. 167 (1961).
19. “Even though we know that rights and remedies are connected, interactive, and
mutually dependent and defining, constitutional tort law pretends that it is not so.” John C.
Jeffries, Jr., Disaggregating Constitutional Torts, 110 YALE L.J. 259, 262 (2000).
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counterpart. This is, to some extent, a result of its 1871 enabling statute and the
special legal requirements that attend suing the government; indeed, William Baude
and an ascendant minority of constitutional tort formalists argue that constitutional
tort doctrine should be even more historically constrained than it currently is.20 But
in large part, the differences between constitutional and private law torts result not
from any such limitations but from the Court’s rule-by-rule approach to challenges
in this context: the doctrine of qualified immunity has evolved without much regard
for the application of § 1988 attorney’s fees, which has developed without much
regard for the near-universal practice of indemnification, and so forth.21
The disjointed nature of constitutional tort law has left open an important
threshold question: what kind of examination is appropriate for the challenges arising
in this context? Contemporary tort scholarship is full of competing theories that
explore the normative and positive roles of tort law, any of which could lend a great
deal of structure and coherence to the law of constitutional torts.22 Broadly speaking,
these theories fall into two distinct categories—instrumental and noninstrumental.
Instrumentalism holds that torts serve as a powerful instrument of public policy: tort
law is and should be shaped to facilitate societal goals like efficient deterrence, loss
spreading, and compensation.23 On the other hand, noninstrumental tort theories treat
tort law as purely deontological in nature, that is, as being justified by principle rather
than presumptively favorable consequences.24
There is a tendency in the constitutional tort context to label constitutional rights
and liberties as noninstrumental, “as deontological side-constraints that trump even
utility-maximizing government actions.”25 But there is little indication that such a
perspective has entered significantly into the actual consideration or construction of
constitutional torts. To the contrary, a closer examination reveals that constitutional
tort law is comprised largely of critiques that loosely reflect—without referencing—
the dominant instrumentalist approach to private law torts. Scholars examining
constitutional torts have typically focused on the resulting consequences of these
suits, criticizing doctrines and practices that fail to appropriately facilitate deterrence
or compensation.26 Joanna Schwartz, for example, writes in a recent article about
how each jurisdiction’s ecosystem of plaintiff’s lawyers, defense counsel, judges,
juries, and legal rules and remedies shapes how many cases are brought.27 This is an

20. See, e.g., Baude, supra note 8.
21. See infra Section II.B, C.
22. Cf. J. Maria Glover, The Structural Role of Private Enforcement Mechanisms in
Public Law, 53 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1137 (2012) (building a conceptual framework cognizant
of both public and private conceptions of tort law).
23. See, e.g., John Gardner, What is Tort Law for?, 30 L. & PHIL. 1, 1–2 (2011).
24. Benjamin C. Zipursky, Civil Recourse, Not Corrective Justice, 91 GEO. L.J. 695, 699
(2003).
25. Daryl J. Levinson, Making Government Pay: Markets, Politics, and the Allocation of
Constitutional Costs, 67 U. CHI. L. REV. 345, 367 (2000).
26. See, e.g., id.; Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Bidding Farewell to Constitutional Torts, 107
CALIF. L. REV. 933 (2019); Jeffries, supra note 19; Daniel J. Meltzer, Deterring Constitutional
Violations by Law Enforcement Officials: Plaintiffs and Defendants as Private Attorneys
General, 88 COLUM. L. REV. 247, 286 (1988).
27. Joanna C. Schwartz, Civil Rights Ecosystems, 118 MICH. L. REV. 1539 (2020).
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instrumentalist (and quintessentially tort-like) mode of analysis—albeit one that has
been applied, so far, with little regard for what tort theorists have said about these
challenges.28
Likewise, the law of constitutional torts as enacted by Congress and the courts is
full of tort-like approaches to tort-like problems that don’t actually reference torts.29
Section 1988, for example, enacts a fee-shifting provision designed to incentivize
plaintiffs’ lawyers to litigate these cases vigorously.30 There is a lively branch of
instrumentalist tort scholarship—again, ignored in discussions of § 1988—
concerned with how the incentivization of plaintiff’ lawyers influences the broader
effects of tort law.31
It may well be that constitutional torts are best considered through a
noninstrumental tort lens.32 Such an approach, though, would require a fundamental
reimagining of the interests at stake in this context, as well as the rejection of decades
of Supreme Court jurisprudence.33 On the other hand, because constitutional tort law
today operates in large part along an instrumentalist valence,34 a framework rooted
in instrumentalism allows for an examination that builds substantially on prior work

28. See, e.g., Kenneth S. Abraham, Prosser’s The Fall of the Citadel, 100 MINN. L. REV.
1823, 1844 (2016); Guido Calabresi, Some Thoughts on Risk Distribution and the Law of Torts,
70 YALE L.J. 499 (1961) (pioneering this approach in the context of private law torts); William
M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, The Positive Economic Theory of Tort Law, 15 GA. L. REV.
851 (1981).
29. Despite the Court’s longstanding disfavor for the creation of federal common law,
constitutional torts continue to be largely guided by policy-rooted and judge-made (and
shaped) doctrines. See, e.g., Hillel Y. Levin & Michael L. Wells, Qualified Immunity and
Statutory Interpretation: A Response to William Baude, 9 CALIF. L. REV. ONLINE 40, 45 (2018)
(arguing that this is appropriate because § 1983 is a common law statute). Bivens is more
clearly a form of federal common law, although it has become, potentially as a consequence,
heavily constrained in recent years. See, e.g., 403 U.S. 388 (1970); William N.
Evans, Supervisory Liability After Iqbal: Decoupling Bivens from Section 1983, 77 U. CHI. L.
REV. 1401, 1405 (2010). This Article accepts as a basic premise—consistent with the Court’s
current jurisprudence—that there remains some role for judicial policymaking in the context
of constitutional torts.
30. 42 U.S.C. § 1988; see, e.g., Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 429 (1983).
31. In expanding on this discussion, Part II further illustrates the inherent instrumentalism
of current constitutional tort scholarship and law.
32. For an example of what that looks like, see, e.g., Bernard P. Dauenhauer & Michael
L. Wells, Corrective Justice and Constitutional Torts, 35 GA. L. REV. 903, 911 (2001)
(providing a corrective justice account of constitutional torts); cf. Barbara E.
Armacost, Qualified Immunity: Ignorance Excused, 51 VAND. L. REV. 583 (1998)
(analogizing constitutional torts to criminal law in an effort to describe qualified immunity
using the noninstrumental language of fairness and fault).
33. Take qualified immunity, for example. When viewed noninstrumentally, the question
of whether constitutional tort suits chill desirable state action is irrelevant. Cf. Michael L.
Wells, The Past and the Future of Constitutional Torts: From Statutory Interpretation to
Common Law Rules, 19 CONN. L. REV. 53 (1986); RONALD DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS
SERIOUSLY 184–205 (1977).
34. See, e.g., infra Section II.C (discussing and highlighting the essential instrumentalism
of § 1988 and qualified immunity).
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in this context, yielding the possibility of sweeping reform that may nevertheless be
adopted under the current legal regime.
II. CONSTITUTIONAL TORTS AS TORTS
Part II seeks to reverse constitutional tort law’s tendency toward ad hoc
policymaking by examining these suits through the instrumentalist lens favored in
the context of private law torts. Although the policy aims of constitutional torts may
not perfectly resemble those in the private law context, Part II applies this tort-like
analysis to the particular rules, practices, and policies of constitutional torts. By
treating constitutional torts as a private party-driven mechanism for vindicating
important public interests—that is, as a kind of a contemporary tort—this discussion
reveals both the significance of optimal deterrence in this context and the inadequacy
of current doctrine in promoting either optimal deterrence or coherent distributional
effects. Part II concludes by resituating prior critiques of constitutional torts within
this proposed framework, revealing the essential shared core at the heart of these
seemingly disparate analyses.
A. The Subjects of Constitutional Tort Deterrence
As is the case with private law torts, deterrence is a central consideration when it
comes to making and evaluating constitutional tort law. But who, exactly, is deterred
by constitutional tort suits? This is an important first-order question for
understanding the constitutional tort system: a regulatory system that acts directly on
potential wrongdoers will operate differently from a system that acts through
policymakers who indirectly influence the commission of torts via hiring, firing,
training, and other such decisions.
In the private law tort context, the deterrence that flows from tort suits is
predominantly conceived in terms of its corporation- and industry-wide effects—that
is, in terms of its impacts on policymakers.35 When it comes to constitutional torts,
however, the Supreme Court has long assumed, without much examination, that the
threat of litigation primarily influences individual potential tortfeasors directly.36
Indeed, this assumption has played a central role in the creation and development of
the doctrine of qualified immunity, which seeks “to shield [individual] officials from
harassment, distraction, and liability when they perform their duties reasonably.”37
As recent research has shown, however, the reality of deterrence in this context is
likely more complicated:38 the deterrent effect of constitutional litigation is split, with
any stress or stigmal burdens of litigation falling predominantly on individual
tortfeasors while the financial costs of litigation, including the damage awards
themselves, are borne almost exclusively by departments and municipalities.

35. See, e.g., David G. Owen, Rethinking the Policies of Strict Products Liability, 33
VAND. L. REV. 681, 711 (1980).
36. See, e.g., Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800 (1982).
37. Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 231 (2009); cf. John C. Coffee, Jr., Class Wars:
The Dilemma of the Mass Tort Class Action, 95 COLUM. L. REV. 1343, 1349 (1995) (discussing
similar agency-cost problems in the mass torts context).
38. See Joanna C. Schwartz, Police Indemnification, 89 N.Y.U. L. REV. 885, 890 (2014).
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This is unintuitive. At first glance, the Supreme Court’s assumption about the
effects of constitutional litigation appears to be correct: because municipal liability’s
stringent “policy or custom” standard serves as a de facto bar to so many
constitutional tort claims brought against municipalities—plaintiffs must show an
official policy or a pattern of departmental misconduct so widespread as to “have the
force of law”39—the overwhelming majority of § 1983 suits for damages are brought
against state actors in their personal capacity. Constitutional litigation is therefore
predominantly concentrated on individual potential tortfeasors: officers working the
beat and so forth.
However, looking only at who is sued when evaluating the deterrent effect of
constitutional litigation leads to deceiving results. Although individual tortfeasors
comprise the bulk of defendants in § 1983 suits, the financial costs of constitutional
litigation are borne almost exclusively by the state—municipal governments and the
like. This is because indemnification, the practice of the municipality or department
paying any settlements or damage awards (and usually also litigation costs) on behalf
of its employees, is nearly universal in the context of constitutional wrongdoing;
individual constitutional tortfeasors effectively never have to pay for their own
misdeeds. In fact, one recent national study revealed that law enforcement officers
financially contributed to only 0.41% of all settlements and judgments against them,
paying less than 0.02% of the total damages.40 Indemnification shifts the deterrent
effect of damage awards from individual officers to department-level
policymakers.41 And, as a result, it is predominantly policymakers who consider the
financial impacts of constitutional litigation. Like their private counterparts,
government bureaucrats are therefore positioned to evaluate the costs and benefits of
policies giving rise to potential liability before enacting those policies.42

39. See Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs. of N.Y.C., 436 U.S. 658, 694 (1978); Bd. of Cnty.
Comm’rs v. Brown, 520 U.S. 397, 411 (1997) (setting out a searching “deliberate
indifference” mens rea requirement); Karen M. Blum, Section 1983 Litigation: The Maze, the
Mud, and the Madness, 23 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 913, 916 (2015) (describing the difficulty
of municipal liability litigation).
40. Schwartz, supra note 38, at 890. Counterintuitively, this study also indicated that
officers never contributed towards punitive damages. Id. It is less clear how widespread
indemnification is outside of the policing context. See generally James E. Pfander, Alexander
A. Reinert & Joanna C. Schwartz, The Myth of Personal Liability: Who Pays When Bivens
Claims Succeed, 72 STAN. L. REV. 561 (2020) (reporting similar results in the context of Bivens
suits in the Federal Bureau of Prisons).
41. The increasing role of third-party insurers in governmental policymaking, see infra
text accompanying note 110, serves as a backstop that further ensures institutional-level
deterrence effects of constitutional tort suits.
42. To what extent governmental policymakers do evaluate the costs and benefits of such
policies, however, is a more difficult question. See Section II.D for more discussion.
Moreover, the question of how exactly constitutional liability impacts department-, municipal, and state-level policy is not perfectly straightforward, and is discussed in greater detail in
Section II.A. For more on individual decision-making within governmental organizations, see
Barbara E. Armacost, Organizational Culture and Police Misconduct, 72 GEO. WASH. L.
REV. 453, 475, 509–10 (2004); PETER H. SCHUCK, SUING GOVERNMENT: CITIZEN REMEDIES
FOR OFFICIAL WRONGS 125–46 (1983).
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This split system ensures that significant deterrence flows from these suits to both
the individual actors personally sued (via the stress and stigma of litigation) and
departmental policymakers (via the financial burdens of litigation). Constitutional
torts may well dissuade officials from taking societally desirable risks; but if so, they
do so in a subtly different manner than what is currently assumed.
There are a number of implications that flow from this. For one, the doctrine of
qualified immunity may present a more robust shield for the conduct of individual
state actors than what the Supreme Court has intended.43 This is because the doctrine
has been shaped around the assumption that the threat of damage awards significantly
motivates individual potential tortfeasors.44 If damage awards exert less of a
deterrence influence on such individual behaviors than what is commonly
understood, because their financial burdens are primarily borne by departments, that
means that qualified immunity is more protective than it was intended to be.
Likewise, because qualified immunity is applied with no regard for whether an
officer will be indemnified, in the event that there are material differences in the
practice of indemnification—as there likely are outside of the context of policing—
the deterrent effects of constitutional tort suits will be unexpectedly uneven.45
Moreover, these split deterrence effects imply that larger damage awards will not
necessarily lead to greater individual-level deterrence: as the value of the claim in
question increases, the stress and stigma of that claim may remain constant or
increase at a lower rate. This suggests that it may be possible to design tonics for
stress or stigma that do not similarly diminish damage awards. If true, qualified
immunity, which tempers both the stress and stigma of litigation and damage awards,
is more protective of state action than is strictly necessary.46
Finally, indemnification constitutes a de facto form of vicarious liability, a private
tort doctrine that shifts the financial costs of wrongdoing from individual employee
tortfeasors to their employers.47 Although Monell concluded that the 1871 Congress
did not intend to impose vicarious liability through § 1983,48 the widespread
voluntary adoption of this practice through indemnification signals that there may be
an appetite for statutory change in this regard. Formalizing the applicability of
vicarious liability in this context would, in turn, likely result in a shift in litigation
toward the deep pockets of municipalities, thereby easing the undesirable individuallevel deterrent effects of constitutional tort suits.49 Treating constitutional torts more

43. See infra Section II.C.2 (discussing qualified immunity in greater detail).
44. See infra Section II.C.2; see also Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 240 (1974)
(describing, as a primary justification of qualified immunity, “the danger that the threat of
[personal] liability would deter [an officer’s] willingness to execute his office with the
decisiveness and the judgment required by the public good”).
45. See infra Section II.C.2.
46. If nothing else, this examination therefore shows how badly more research is needed
into the deterrence effects of constitutional tort suits.
47. See, e.g., Meyer v. Holley, 537 U.S. 280, 285 (2003).
48. Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs. of N.Y.C., 436 U.S. 658, 691–92 (1978).
49. Some states already voluntarily do this. See Lisa D. Hawke, Municipal Liability and
Respondeat Superior: An Empirical Study and Analysis, 38 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 831, 848
(2005) (reporting study showing that “about half of the cities accept respondeat superior
liability under state law for misconduct by individual police officers”). Liability could likewise
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like private law torts in this respect would therefore mitigate one of the more
significant problems engendered by constitutional litigation—its chill on individual
action—potentially obviating the need for qualified immunity altogether.50
B. Optimal Deterrence
This discussion brushes up against a second important question in this context:
how much deterrence do (or should) constitutional torts seek?
At the very least, it is probably safe to conclude that constitutional torts do not
strive for absolute deterrence—although, certainly, no amount of constitutional
wrongdoing is desirable.51 This is because the deterrent effect of constitutional
litigation presents a double-edged sword. The threat of damages discourages
unconstitutional misconduct, yes. But it also may dissuade officials from
constitutional actions, as the burdens of litigation and liability lead state actors to shy
away from taking societally beneficial and constitutionally permissible risks. A
system tailored to ensuring that the Constitution was never violated would thus most
likely also undesirably depress state action.52
Instead, constitutional tort law appears to strive for “optimal deterrence,” albeit
with little express recognition of this aim.53 Too much constitutional litigation chills
societally beneficial state action; too little results in the violation of constitutional
rights and liberties.54 Indeed, as is the case with private law torts, whether conceived
as a system for maximizing compensation, deterrence, or some more abstract goal
like corrective justice, there will always be an inherent tension between the benefits
and detriments of constitutional torts—and some point of equipoise at which the
value of more constitutional litigation is outweighed by its costs.
Constitutional tort law’s unspoken embrace of optimal deterrence (and
instrumentalism more generally) is reflected, in part, in the Court’s acceptance that
compensatory damages “ordinarily suffice to deter constitutional violations.”55 This

be shifted to states via limited waivers of sovereign immunity, which would allow suits against
states in a greater range of circumstances or for larger amounts.
50. See infra Section II.C.2 (discussing qualified immunity in greater detail); Fallon,
supra note 26, at 940 (arguing on behalf of such a scheme). Such a change would be broadly
consistent with developments in tort theory: “No longer is individual ‘blameworthiness’ the
acid test of liability; the principle of equitable loss-spreading has joined fault as a factor in
distributing the costs of official misconduct.” Owen v. City of Independence, 445 U.S. 622,
657 (1980).
51. Cf. Gary S. Becker, Crime and Punishment: An Economic Approach, 76 J. POL.
ECON. 169, 180 (1968) (discussing and modeling a similar question in the criminal context,
reaching the same conclusion).
52. “Action has significant personal costs without corresponding personal benefits;
inaction may have few benefits—personal or social—but little cost as well.” Cass Sunstein,
Judicial Relief and Public Tort Law, 92 YALE L.J. 749, 751 (1983) (concluding, therefore, that
“[t]he possibility of personal liability for unlawful action tends to generate inaction, delay, or
an unproductive formalism that produces little but documents to defend officials in lawsuits”).
53. For a rare recognition of optimality in this context, see Levinson, supra note 25.
54. Cf. Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 231 (2009) (gesturing to the importance of
balance in this context without fully embracing optimal deterrence).
55. Memphis Cmty. Sch. Dist. v. Stachura, 477 U.S. 299, 310 (1986). It is also reflected
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may be contrasted with the approach taken in the criminal defense context, where the
Court has relied on far more severe deterrent remedies like the exclusionary rule.56
Unlike exclusion, which will often result in complete exoneration, compensatory
damage awards impose the costs of wrongdoing on the tortfeasor, and only those
costs, thereby ensuring that any associated harms of unconstitutional actions are
internalized by the tortfeasor.57 This, in turn, encourages policymakers to act “when
it is economically efficient, from a societal point of view, to do so”—i.e., when the
benefits of an activity outweigh its harms.58 But it also means that if there are
categories of constitutional wrongdoing for which no amount of rights violation is
acceptable, as some scholars have suggested,59 the current compensatory-damagesbased deterrence regime will fall short. Except in those rare circumstances in which
injunctive relief can be obtained, to violate the Constitution, the state must merely be
willing to pay for any resulting harm.60
If this sounds familiar, it is because it is a reflection of “efficient deterrence
theory,” the dominant instrumentalist view of private law tort deterrence.61 Efficient
deterrence theory holds that that damage awards—generally determined by the extent
of harm—will compel policymakers “to internalize the total cost of [the] harmful
activity.”62 Constitutional torts’ reliance on compensatory damages for deterrence is
at least a rudimentary imitation of efficient deterrence in the private law tort context.

in the Court’s application of § 1988 and qualified immunity: both of these rules seek to permit
or even encourage some—but not too much—constitutional litigation. See infra Section II.C
(discussing this in more detail).
56. See, e.g., United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 980 (1984) (Stevens, J., dissenting);
Wainwright v. Witt, 469 U.S. 412, 463 (1985) (Brennan, J., dissenting); cf. Levinson, supra
note 25, at 367 (noting that “constitutional rights are most commonly conceived as
deontological side-constraints that trump even utility-maximizing government action”). But
see Fallon, supra note 26 at 964 (describing the “common phenomenon of interest balancing”
in substantive constitutional law); Jamal Greene, A Private Law Court in a Public Law System,
12 LAW & ETHICS HUM. RTS. 37, 53–58 (2018) (arguing for explicitly adopting such an
approach).
57. In practice, this calculus will be muddied by the risk of non-recovery as well as the
transaction costs of obtaining compensation, including the stress, stigma, and financial
burdens of litigation. Sections II.C and D will discuss these complicating factors in more
detail.
58. Marc Galanter & David Luban, Poetic Justice: Punitive Damages and Legal
Pluralism, 42 AM. U. L. REV. 1393, 1447 (1993); see also Armacost, supra note 42, at 475
(“To the extent that chiefs of police view a little bit of brutality as an effective law enforcement
tool, they will balance the costs of liability against the perceived gains of aggressive
policing.”).
59. See, e.g., Levinson, supra note 25, at 368 (arguing that the “optimal level of violations
of [certain] rights may be close to zero”).
60. Cf., e.g., Guido Calabresi, Some Thoughts on Risk Distribution and the Law of Torts,
70 YALE L.J. 499, 535–38 (1961). The alternative would be to significantly harshen remedies:
if the penalty for violating the Constitution was $1 billion or more, violations would approach
zero.
61. See, e.g., Galanter et al., supra note 58, at 1447; Robert Cooter, Economic Analysis of
Punitive Damages, 56 S. CAL. L. REV. 79, 82-85 (1982); Guido Calabresi, Some Thoughts on
Risk Distribution and the Law of Torts, 70 YALE L.J. 499, 535–38 (1961).
62. Galanter et al., supra note 58, at 1447; see also Cooper Indus., Inc. v. Leatherman
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For an illustration of this, imagine a police department considering whether its
officers should be retrained to avoid using chokeholds.63 Assuming, for purposes of
this hypothetical, that chokeholds are an effective means of restraint without a good
alternative, allowing officers to use chokeholds will lead to more arrests than will a
no-chokeholds policy—and, consequently, to better public safety. On the other hand,
chokeholds occupy a constitutional gray area and are prone to abuse.64 If the police
department allows its officers to apprehend suspects using chokeholds, it is likely
that additional constitutional harms will result—for which the department will have
to pay via § 1983 damage awards.65 Under the current remedial scheme, if the
chokehold policy is likely to result in $100,000 in costs (consisting primarily of the
risk-adjusted costs of constitutional litigation) but only $80,000 in benefits
(consisting of the utility gains of improved public safety and the money saved from
not having to retrain officers), the police department will be incentivized to abandon
its use of chokeholds. On the other hand, if the chokehold policy is likely to result in
$100,000 in costs but $120,000 in benefits, the police department will be encouraged
to continue to use chokeholds—despite the fact that doing so will result in some
constitutional harms.66 Real-world decision-making is not, of course, as easily
simplified or quantified as this example implies. For purposes of this discussion,
though, it is only important to accept that a rational instrumentalist choice to
implement a policy comes down, on a very general level, to some version of
weighing the costs and benefits of that policy.
Recognizing the importance of optimal deterrence in this context does not require
subscribing to a view of constitutional tort law limited to strictly pecuniary benefits
and costs.67 Nor does it require the calculation of a single universal optimal level of
deterrence that applies to all potential rights violations. The nature of the
governmental interests implicated by the Fourth Amendment differ from those
implicated by the First Amendment, and the rights protected by the Fourth
Amendment differ from the rights protected by the First Amendment. As such, the
optimal balance between the government’s interests and the underlying rights may

Tool Grp., Inc., 532 U.S. 424, 439 (2001); Levinson, supra note 25, at 347 (recognizing “the
similarities between the goals (deterrence) and mechanisms (cost-internalization) of private
law damages and constitutional cost remedies”). Whether or not damage awards do
accomplish this in the constitutional context will be discussed in more detail in Section II.C.
63. The chokeholds policy was first used as an illustration of efficient deterrence theory
by Daryl Levinson. See Levinson, supra note 25, at 371.
64. Cf. City of L.A. v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95, 108 (1983) (recognizing the possibility that
L.A.’s chokehold policy would result in “injury and death unconstitutionally inflicted”).
65. The constitutional violations are, therefore, “a by-product of socially productive
government activity.” Levinson, supra note 25, at 370.
66. This example is intended for illustration and not to imply that these sorts of values
may be identified with this level of precision.
67. See infra Section II.C, discussing the inherent value of constitutional rights. Indeed,
as the Court has recognized, efficient deterrence may not even represent the preferable
paradigm throughout private law torts: “Citizens and legislators may rightly insist that they
are willing to tolerate some loss in economic efficiency in order to deter what they consider
morally offensive conduct, albeit cost-beneficial morally offensive conduct; efficiency is just
one consideration among many.” Cooper Indus., Inc. v. Leatherman Tool Grp., Inc., 532 U.S.
424, 439–40 (2001) (quoting Galanter et al., supra note 58, at 1450).
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depend on which interests and which rights are affected; optimal deterrence in the
context of the Fourth Amendment may not be optimal in the context of the First
Amendment.68
Indeed, although there has been little discussion of how this balance should be
conducted, the Court has implicitly recognized the existence of right-by-right and
interest-by-interest differences in its jurisprudence on injunctive relief. Injunctive
relief is not a perfectly parallel remedy to damage awards—among other things, the
usefulness of injunctive relief is limited by the difficulty of predicting future
wrongdoing, the availability of a civil rights bar ready to quickly file, and courts’
willingness to grant this extraordinary remedy69—but the legal test for issuing an
injunction implicitly reflects a similar acceptance of optimal deterrence: to halt a
constitutional violation through injunctive relief, a plaintiff must not only prove
likely constitutional wrongdoing, but that “the balance of equities tips in his favor,
and that an injunction is in the public interest.”70 Courts considering injunctive relief
have repeatedly declined to balance formulaically the rights and interests in question,
applying instead a context-specific evaluation that assigns different weights to
different interests.71
C. Nonoptimal Deterrence
Although the current doctrine is full of discussions of the importance of
maximizing deterrence or minimizing the disruption of effective governance and
policing, constitutional tort law’s rule-by-rule approach has facilitated little

68. See, e.g., Richard H. Fallon, Jr. & Daniel J. Meltzer, New Law, Non-Retroactivity,
and Constitutional Remedies, 104 HARV. L. REV. 1731, 1789–90 (1991) (“For example, our
constitutional tradition recognizes a stronger interest in relief from continuing coercion—for
instance, in reversing an unconstitutional conviction—than in obtaining remedies for the
government’s violation of the contract clause.”); Levinson, supra note 25 at 368 (“Some types
of constitutional violations resemble intentional torts or crimes in that they can be avoided
with minimal effort or precaution-taking by government. The optimal level of violations of
these rights may be close to zero.”).
69. As the civil rights and civil liberties response to aggressive policing of the Standing
Rock NoDAPL movement illustrates, these sorts of access issues can present a real problem
for litigators: although a wide range of potential constitutional abuses were well-publicized by
early September 2016, the first and only attempt to seek any sort of injunctive relief was filed
in late November—and it was denied. Dundon v. Kirchmeier, No. 1:16-CV-406, 2017 WL
5894552, at *1 (D.N.D. Feb. 7, 2017), aff’d, 701 F. App’x 538 (8th Cir. 2017); see also, e.g.,
Ziglar v. Abbasi, 137 S. Ct. 1843, 1858 (2017) (“[I]f equitable remedies prove insufficient, a
damages remedy might be necessary to redress past harm and deter future violations.”); We
Are the ACLU of North Dakota, ACLU N.D., https://www.aclund.org/en/about/staff
[https://perma.cc/PK3J-6VSP] (listing a single ACLU staff attorney responsible for managing
any litigation throughout all of North Dakota, South Dakota, and Wyoming).
70. Winter v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 555 U.S. 7, 20 (2008).
71. See, e.g., Hill v. McDonough, 547 U.S. 573, 584 (2006) (recognizing the “State’s
strong interest in enforcing its criminal judgments without undue interference from the federal
courts” (emphasis added)); Alexander v. United States, 509 U.S. 544, 554 (1993) (recognizing
that the Court has “interpreted the First Amendment as providing greater protection from prior
restraints than from subsequent punishments”).

2021]

THE CONSTITUTIONAL TORT SYSTEM

585

consideration of balance or optimization. The result has been a collection of
constitutional tort remedies that work ineffectively, or in tension with each other,
toward this end.
1. Section 1988 and Nonoptimal Deterrence
Section 1988, for example, is a fee-shifting statute that generally results in the
state paying plaintiffs’ attorney’s fees in successful constitutional litigation.72 This
ensures that even low-value cases and cases seeking purely injunctive relief are
litigated; the importance of vindicating constitutional rights is such that Congress felt
justified in breaking from the longstanding U.S. tradition of each party paying its
own fees in litigation.73
But this is not the extent of § 1988’s import. Section 1988’s provision of
attorney’s fees for all constitutional tort suits points to a view of the constitutional
torts system that is concerned more generally with enhancing the protection of
constitutional rights and liberties: attorney’s fees plus compensatory damages will
provide greater deterrence than compensatory damages alone.74 Such an approach
would be consistent, broadly speaking, with that taken in the criminal defense
context; as Justice Stevens powerfully wrote in his dissent in United States v. Leon,
“[I]t is the very purpose of a Bill of Rights to identify values that may not be
sacrificed to expediency.”75 It does not, however, necessarily imply a rejection of
optimal deterrence; § 1988 attorney’s fees simply shift the systemic deterrent effect
of constitutional torts toward more (and potentially above-efficient) deterrence.
The Court has also read another purpose into § 1988’s enhancement effect: to
offset constraints on compensatory damage awards in this context. In Carey v.
Piphus, the Court held that compensatory damages could not be awarded based on
the presumed inherent value of the constitutional provision at issue; awards must be
limited to only those injuries that accompany a constitutional violation.76 This means

72. 42 U.S.C. § 1988. Because, however, the statute speaks in the general terms of the
“prevailing party,” courts may also (though rarely do) shift fees to § 1983 plaintiffs as well—
albeit “only where it is shown that [the] suit was clearly frivolous, vexatious, or brought for
harassment purposes.” S. REP. 94-1011, at 5 (1976), as reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5908,
5912.
73. See 42 U.S.C. § 1988; S. REP. No. 94-1011, at 6 (discussing the purpose of attorney’s
fees in, among other things, ensuring that even low-value cases and cases seeking injunctive
relief are litigated); Alyeska Pipeline Serv. Co. v. Wilderness Soc’y, 421 U.S. 240, 240 (1975)
(holding that only Congress can authorize an exception to the “American Rule”).
74. See, e.g., David Rosenberg, Mandatory-Litigation Class Action: The Only Option for
Mass Tort Cases, 115 HARV. L. REV. 831, 853–54 (2002) (discussing and defining the
compensation-centered private law tort understanding of optimal deterrence).
75. 468 U.S. 897, 980 (1984) (Stevens, J., dissenting). Anything less fails to recognize
the “transcendent importance of the Bill of Rights,” Wainwright v. Witt, 469 U.S. 412, 463
(1985) (Brennan, J., dissenting), instead relegating the Constitution to little more than a utilitymaximizing tort statute. Meltzer, supra note 26, at 286 (discussing differences between civil
and criminal remedies for the deterrence of constitutional wrongdoing).
76. 435 U.S. 247, 253 (1978) (basing holding, in part, on an attempt to apply the “common
law” of tort compensation to constitutional violations); John C. Jeffries, Jr., Damages for
Constitutional Violations: The Relation of Risk to Injury in Constitutional Torts, 75 VA. L.
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that an employee fired without due process may not be able to recover more than
nominal damages if her employer can later show good cause for her firing—despite
the individual and societal value of whatever process has been lost. Such a rule skews
the systemic effect of constitutional torts, disfavoring the underlying constitutional
interests at stake, especially in the context of violations of due process. But because
of § 1988, the Court was not dissuaded: “[T]he potential liability of §
1983 defendants for attorney’s fees provides additional—and by no means
inconsequential—assurance that agents of the State will not deliberately ignore due
process rights.”77
The problem with these respective justifications for § 1988 is that attorney’s fees
add to the value of lawsuits with little regard to the underlying purposes implicated
by these suits: it is cases that are more complicated or more resolutely defended that
will yield the richest attorney’s fees, not cases involving the greatest threats to the
most sacred of constitutional values.78 Section 1988 may facilitate above-efficient
deterrence and compensation, but it does so in a haphazard manner, disconnected
from whatever it is that justifies additional deterrence. Likewise, although attorney’s
fees can offset the Court’s narrow view of compensatory damages in this context,
they rarely will, instead providing too much or too little compensation based on
factors exogenous to the right or liberty at issue. Under either justification for
attorney fee shifting, constitutional torts demand better deterrence rather than simply
more deterrence. Section 1988 provides the latter but not necessarily the former.79

REV. 1461, 1475 (1989) (proposing that constitutional damage awards should be limited to
“constitutionally relevant risks.” For example, “Compensation for violations of the fourth
amendment [sic] should redress the invasion of privacy, not the costs of criminal
prosecution.”).
77. Carey, 435 U.S. at 257 n.11 (citation omitted); see also Memphis Cmty. Sch. Dist. v.
Stachura, 477 U.S. 299, 307 (1986) (“Deterrence is also an important purpose of this system,
but it operates through the mechanism of damages that are compensatory—damages grounded
in determinations of plaintiffs’ actual losses.” (emphasis in original)). This is not the only
justification for the Court’s ruling: the Court also expressed concern over how such awards
would be determined. Id. Also, as Daryl Levinson has noted, “one interesting hypothesis is
that the Court was reluctant to allow monetary recovery for the intrinsic value of constitutional
rights because of the need to maintain incommensurability between rights and money. If the
value of constitutional rights and cash could be compared on a single metric, then it would be
more difficult to think of constitutional rights as qualitatively different from other social
interests and values. Yet the legitimacy of constitutionalism depends on maintaining the
incommensurability of constitutional rights so they can work as trumps.” Daryl J.
Levinson, Rights Essentialism and Remedial Equilibration, 99 COLUM. L. REV. 857, 934 n.327
(1999).
78. The actual financial calculus associated with bringing suits in this context is more
complicated, although not in a way that renders § 1988 more coherent. For plaintiffs’ lawyers,
who typically foot the bill for these suits, the likelihood of litigation success and the costs of
litigation (the latter of which often consists largely of expert fees) are also important
considerations in the determination of what cases are brought. The result is that § 1988
primarily incentivizes the litigation of cases with a high likelihood of success (or settlement)
that require little by way of expert testimony.
79. As Maggie Lemos has indicated, fee shifting provisions like § 1988 may actually be
ineffective or even counterproductive in facilitating constitutional litigation. Margaret H.
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2. Qualified Immunity and Nonoptimal Deterrence
Even while it has approved of § 1988’s role in incentivizing constitutional tort
suits, the Supreme Court has also expressed concern about the drawbacks of too
much litigation in this context, albeit with little acknowledgment of § 1988’s
potential role in any such crisis.80
This concern springs from the recognition that the overwhelming majority of the
conduct deterred by constitutional tort suits—policing, public policy programs, and
so forth—also produces societal benefits, often substantial. As a consequence, the
Supreme Court has been quick to identify litigation externalities that may lead to too
much deterrence: the “fear of being sued,” for example, may “dampen the ardor of
all but the most resolute, or the most irresponsible public officials, in the unflinching
discharge of their duties.”81 Similarly, individual potential wrongdoers in the
“government [may] not fully internalize the [dispersed] social benefits of [their]
activity.”82 And when constitutional torts deter good state action along with the bad,
the resulting consequences can be serious, undermining the government’s role in
safeguarding and furthering the public interest.83
This concern regarding systemic overdeterrence (although rarely framed by the
Court in such instrumentalist terms) has fueled the creation of an entire court-created
legal doctrine: qualified immunity.84 Under the doctrine of qualified immunity, state

Lemos, Special Incentives to Sue, 95 MINN. L. REV. 782 (2011).
80. See, e.g., Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800 (1982) (disregarding § 1988); Malley v.
Briggs, 475 U.S. 335 (1986) (same); Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194 (2001) (same); Pearson v.
Callahan, 555 U.S. 223 (2009) (same). Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167 (1961), predates § 1988,
which was enacted in 1976, Civil Rights Attorney’s Fees Awards Act of 1976, Pub. L. No.
94-559, 90 Stat. 2641.
81. Harlow, 457 U.S. at 814 (internal modifications omitted) (quoting Gregoire v. Biddle,
177 F.2d 579, 581 (2d. Cir. 1949), cert. denied, 339 U.S. 949 (1950)). Put in other words,
lawsuit risk-aversion might lead public officials to be overly sensitive to the costs imposed by
constitutional litigation.
82. Levinson, supra note 25, at 354 (emphasis added) (describing another concern
repeatedly raised by the Supreme Court).
83. “[T]he public interest requires decisions and actions to enforce laws for the protection
of the public.” Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 241 (1974), abrogated on other grounds
by Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800 (1982); cf. Coffee, supra note 37, at 1349.
84. John C. Jeffries, Jr., The Right-Remedy Gap in Constitutional Law, 109 YALE L.J. 87,
90 (1999) (“The threat of overdeterrence—more accurately, the threat of unintended
deterrence of socially desirable activity—justifies limiting damage recoveries in order to
protect the legitimate but nonconstitutional interests at stake in the business of government.”).
This oft-cited policy justification for qualified immunity may not formally ground the rule.
See, e.g., Baude, supra note 8, at 78–79 (recognizing this reasoning but indicating that “the
Court has [so far] used more traditional legal arguments as the opening wedge for these policy
concerns”). On the other hand, several recent decisions of the Supreme Court have implied
otherwise. See, e.g., Ziglar v. Abbasi, 137 S. Ct. 1843, 1866 (2017) (“The qualified immunity
rule seeks a proper balance between . . . competing interests.”); City & Cty. of S.F. v. Sheehan,
135 S. Ct. 1765, 1774 n.3 (2015) (“Because of the importance of qualified immunity ‘to
society as a whole,’ the Court often corrects lower courts when they wrongly subject individual
officers to liability.” (citation omitted) (quoting Harlow, 457 U.S. at 814)); White v. Pauly,
137 S. Ct. 548, 551 (2017) (reiterating qualified immunity’s special status due to its
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officials acting in their official capacity are only liable when they violate “clearly
established” constitutional law.85 This effectively gives defendants in constitutional
litigation the benefit of the doubt. When a constitutional violation could have been
based off of a reasonable mistake of law—even if it, in fact, wasn’t—qualified
immunity requires dismissal.86 At least in theory, this frees state action from the
choking collar of liability.87
The doctrine of qualified immunity may, however, go beyond simply providing a
resolution for such externality-related failures in optimal deterrence. In direct tension
with (and with no regard for) § 1988, qualified immunity depresses the deterrence
that would otherwise flow from compensatory damage awards:88 the objective
reasonableness standard ensures, in the balance between the competing interests at
stake, that it is the state that benefits from its mistakes. By placing the entire burden
of uncertainty on the victims of constitutional wrongdoing, qualified immunity shifts
the systemic deterrent effect of constitutional litigation toward less overall
deterrence.89
Moreover, as is the case with § 1988, qualified immunity employs a standard that
is poorly tailored to the underlying issues at stake. Of the many factors identified by
the Court that might increase the deterrent value of constitutional litigation to aboveoptimal levels, qualified immunity’s standard addresses only one: protecting state

importance “to society as a whole” (quoting id.)); Alan K. Chen, Rosy Pictures and Renegade
Officials: The Slow Death of Monroe v. Pape, 78 UMKC L. REV. 889, 910 (2010) (“Like
absolute immunity, qualified immunity is entirely policy-driven.”); Fallon, supra note 26, at
946 n.46 (tracing “the origins of official immunity” to Spalding v. Vilas, which based its
finding of official immunity on “general considerations of public policy and convenience”
(quoting Spalding v. Vilas, 161 U.S. 483, 498 (1896)); id. at 994 (noting that in Allen v.
McCurry and University of Tennessee v. Elliott, “the Court held that suits under § 1983 were
foreclosed under preclusion principles that had not yet emerged at the time of § 1983’s
enactment”).
85. Harlow, 457 U.S. at 818 (1982).
86. See id. at 818–19.
87. Recent research by Joanna Schwartz implies, however, that the doctrine may not
work: few cases are actually dismissed on qualified immunity grounds. See Joanna C.
Schwartz, How Qualified Immunity Fails, 127 YALE L.J. 2 (2017). It may be, however, that
the doctrine of qualified immunity winnows out cases prefiling, which would not be reflected
in Schwartz’s study.
88. At the very least, sub-efficient deterrence is one result of the doctrine of qualified
immunity. See, e.g., Devon W. Carbado, Blue-on-Black Violence: A Provisional Model of
Some of the Causes, 104 GEO. L.J. 1479, 1523 (2016); 2 SHELDON H. NAHMOD, CIVIL RIGHTS
& CIVIL LIBERTIES LITIGATION: THE LAW OF SECTION 1983 § 8:5 (4th ed. 2016) (expressing
concern about the Fourteenth Amendment specifically); see also Jeffries, supra note 84, at
99–100 (“Qualified immunity reduces government’s incentives to avoid constitutional
violations.”); cf. Ziglar v. Abbasi, 137 S. Ct. 1843, 1870-71 (2017) (Thomas, J., concurring)
(expressing reservations about qualified immunity, albeit for non-policy reasons); Zadeh v.
Robinson, No. 1750518, slip op., Aug. 31, 2018, http://www.ca5.uscourts.gov/opinions/pub
/17/17-50518%20-CV0.pdf [https://perma.cc/5CAE-JL6T] (Willett, J., concurring) (same).
89. As Myriam Gilles observes in In Defense of Making Governments Pay, qualified
immunity essentially shifts the scienter requirement for constitutional torts from negligence to
recklessness or intentionality. Myriam E. Gilles, In Defense of Making Government Pay: The
Deterrent Effect of Constitutional Tort Remedies, 35 GA. L. REV. 845, 856–57 (2001).
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officials from the consequences of their reasonable mistakes.90 The extent to which
stress or stigma are likely to accompany a suit, on the other hand, does not factor into
the question of whether qualified immunity applies.91 Although qualified immunity’s
applicability at early stages of litigation helps guard against the stress and stigma of
litigation, there will be cases with enormous stress and stigma burdens to which
qualified immunity does not apply; and there will be cases that give rise to virtually
no stress or stigma that are quickly dismissed under qualified immunity.
The means by which qualified immunity acts is similarly ill-suited to the
doctrine’s underlying purposes. Qualified immunity seeks to mitigate the associated
effects of litigation—stress, stigma, litigation costs, and so forth—that can chill
desirable policing and governance.92 Although each of these factors weighs on state
action in a matter of degree, qualified immunity offers a resolution that is strictly
binary: immunity or no immunity. This disjunction between the nature of the
problem and the nature of the resolution means that even if individual applications
of qualified immunity appear defensible, the systemic effect of the doctrine will be
nonoptimal.93 And because these problems with qualified immunity’s standard and
resolution are likely to manifest unevenly throughout constitutional tort law,94
qualified immunity may give rise to too much and too little constitutional litigation.
Finally, qualified immunity’s development with little regard for the broader
constitutional tort system has resulted in numerous additional potential issues related
to the interactions among qualified immunity and other doctrines and practices. For
one, qualified immunity’s inattention to the split deterrent effects in this context may
yield widespread (and unnecessary) under-compensation: numerous victims of
constitutional wrongdoing are deprived of redress even where recovery would not

90. See, e.g., Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 231 (2009).
91. See, e.g., Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 526 (1985) (recognizing stress and stigma
as key deterrence concerns implicated by constitutional litigation).
92. See, e.g., Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 526 (1985).
93. This may be illustrated with the following example: Imagine a constitutional suit for
$100,000 in compensatory damages that gives rise to $25,000 in accompanying transaction
costs and nonpecuniary harms. Left alone, the deterrence value of this suit ($125,000) is
greater than necessary to internalize the societal harms in question ($100,000). Under the
doctrine of qualified immunity, there are two possibilities: (1) the suit would go forward,
providing, if successful, $125,000 in deterrence value, which is $25,000 too much; or (2) the
suit would be dismissed, providing $0 in deterrence, which is $100,000 too little.
At least in theory, the aggregated effects of qualified immunity could still result in optimal
deterrence: if 20% of such suits were dismissed under qualified immunity, the risk-adjusted
cost of litigation would be $100,000 (80% x $125,000 + 20% x $0). Because, however, the
percentage of suits dismissed under qualified immunity is not influenced by the nonpecuniary
costs at stake in a type of suit—stress, stigma, and so forth—there is little reason to believe
that qualified immunity will facilitate anything close to optimal levels of constitutional
litigation.
94. See, e.g., Mullenix v. Luna, 136 S. Ct. 305, 308 (2015) (describing the heightened
importance of qualified immunity in the “Fourth Amendment context”); Gilles, supra note 89,
at 857 (observing qualified immunity’s particular applicability in the context of negligence
torts, where officers’ heat of the moment decisions implicate fact- and context-dependent
inquiries with few well-developed standards).
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likely result in the chilling of desirable state action.95 Moreover, a constitutional tort
lawsuit might ultimately yield anywhere from nothing to several multiples of what
compensatory damages alone would provide (once attorney’s fees are included), with
the difference turning on a single judge’s determination of whether a constitutional
violation was clearly established—and not of whether the Constitution was violated
or whether the constitutional violation was particularly objectionable. This greatly
magnifies horizontal inequity and unpredictability, as the judge who is assigned or
the jurisdiction in which a case is brought become even more important to the
resolution of the case. Indeed, the harshness of qualified immunity may be prompting
some judges to be reluctant in its application, which would further amplify such
effects.
As this discussion shows, qualified immunity has been shaped without proper
consideration for either its purposes or its effects. Irrespective of whether these
failures merit fully replacing the doctrine,96 this Article provides a template for how
policy-driven changes to qualified immunity (and § 1988 and other rules in this
context) should be considered by courts.
D. Resituating Prior Critiques
This Article is not the first to question or criticize the operation of constitutional
tort law. (Qualified immunity arises out of one such line of criticism.) Part II
therefore concludes by examining, through this Article’s instrumentalist lens, a
number of other critiques of constitutional torts. This, in turn, reveals a common
thread running throughout—to which Part III adds: “damages that compensate for
actual harm” do not “ordinarily suffice to deter constitutional violations.”97
Importantly, although this discussion illustrates the numerous ways in which the
constitutional tort system may be skewed or imbalanced, it does not strike at the
deeper normative question of balance.98 Ensuring neither too much nor too little
constitutional litigation must be, even in the face of these critiques, a primary policy
consideration of constitutional tort law.

95. Indeed, under qualified immunity, it is possible that an officer who violates her
department’s guidelines may be immunized from liability, irrespective of whether the
guidelines in question were correctly and carefully crafted to protect a constitutional right.
Such a rule encourages neither careful policing nor responsible policy design.
96. See infra Part IV.D.
97. Memphis Cmty. Sch. Dist. v. Stachura, 477 U.S. 299, 310 (1986). The Supreme
Court’s continued acceptance of this rule is especially perplexing given that most § 1983
“damages” take the form of settlements. Richard Emery & Ilann Margalit Maazel, Why Civil
Rights Lawsuits Do Not Deter Police Misconduct: The Conundrum of Indemnification and a
Proposed Solution, 28 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 587, 589 (2000). And although settlement values
typically closely track the perceived value of the case in question, they rarely constitute the
full amount demanded.
98. See supra Section II.B.
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1. Political, Not Economic, Costs
First, in Making Government Pay: Markets, Politics, and the Allocation of
Constitutional Costs, Daryl Levinson argues that “government actors respond to
political, not market, incentives.”99 As a result, “[t]he only way to predict the effects
of constitution cost remedies is to convert the financial costs they impose into
political costs.”100 This insight does not necessarily imply that constitutional torts
result in systemic overdeterrence or underdeterrence, but rather that the behavioral
effects of constitutional litigation may be different than what is widely assumed:
political cost translation effects can render compensatory damage awards
inadequate—or too strong.
Levinson’s argument may be illustrated by returning to the chokehold
hypothetical. Imagine, for example, that the police department in question answers
to a voting population that is somewhat inattentive to tax increases but is very
cognizant of public safety. $100,000 in chokehold-related § 1983 damages, passed
through to the population via higher taxes, may therefore generate only $50,000 in
political costs. On the other hand, the $80,000 in public safety benefits created from
using chokeholds may give rise to $80,000 in political capital. In such circumstances,
a policy that the police department should abandon under efficient deterrence theory
(because its costs—$100,000—exceed its benefits—$80,000) may be left in place
(because its political costs—$50,000—do not exceed its political benefits—
$80,000).
This is, however, only a problem insofar as political costs diverge from economic
costs. As Myriam Gilles writes, “constitutional damage remedies, although
denominated in dollars, clearly translate into the political currency that moves
political actors.”101 On the other hand, Marc Miller and Ronald Wright have argued
that tort liability may, paradoxically, financially benefit police departments, as “city
council members, county boards, and city and county administrators . . . reward
police with larger budgets, since the political returns for higher police funding and
appearing tough on crime may be worth the budgetary cost.”102 Further research is
needed to determine to what extent and when economic and political costs diverge.
This is not, however, the only way in which Levinson’s insight complicates the
view of constitutional deterrence. Individuals and communities harmed by

99. Levinson, supra note 25, at 347.
100. Id. (noting that “any such model will be highly contextual, complex, and
controversial”); cf. SCHUCK, supra note 42, at 125. But cf. Louis Kaplow, An Economic
Analysis of Legal Transitions, 99 HARV. L. REV. 509, 567–70 (1986); Edward Rubin,
Commentary, Rational States?, 83 VA. L. REV. 1433, 1439–42 (1997).
101. Gilles, supra note 89, at 861. It may rarely be the case that $100,000 in economic
costs does not generate roughly $100,000 in political costs.
102. Marc L. Miller & Ronald F. Wright, Secret Police and the Mysterious Case of the
Missing Tort Claims, 52 BUFF. L. REV. 757, 782 (2004). More recent research, however, has
shown that such risks may be overstated: “[S]ettlements and judgments in suits against law
enforcement agencies and officers are not always—or even usually—paid from jurisdictions’
general funds.” Joanna C. Schwartz, How Governments Pay: Lawsuits, Budgets, and Police
Reform, 63 UCLA L. REV. 1144, 1148 (2016) (reporting results of empirical study on this
question).
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unconstitutional misconduct will express their distaste for these harms through
voting decisions—thereby directly imposing the political costs of wrongdoing on the
relevant policymakers.103 The tyranny of the majority means, however, that these
first-level political consequences will often—but not always—prove insufficient to
ensure adequate deterrence.104 And whereas the politically powerful may seek
recourse through their influence, politically vulnerable individuals and
communities—whose voices and votes may carry little weight with policymakers—
must depend more fully on constitutional litigation to ensure adequate deterrence.
Similarly, where the benefits of state action accrue to a community that lacks
political power, those benefits may be undervalued by state policymakers: the
political capital generated by aiding a politically powerless community will often be
less than the political capital generated by aiding a politically influential
community.105 This effect could cut toward overdeterrence and therefore suboptimal
employment of state action that disproportionately benefits those individuals and
communities with less electoral influence.
2. Governmental Failure to Internalize Costs
Second, several scholars have described governance-related problems that may
limit the deterrent effect of constitutional litigation. Underlying each of these
critiques is a broader skepticism about constitutional deterrence—that is, that
constitutional actors are unlikely to undertake (or are incapable of undertaking) the
sort of careful cost-benefit analyses on which optimal deterrence relies.
In Myths and Mechanics of Deterrence: The Role of Lawsuits in Law Enforcement
Decisionmaking, Joanna Schwartz shows that many police departments do not
adequately collect or track data on damage awards and, therefore, they lack the
information necessary to internalize properly the costs of their constitutional
wrongdoing.106 The informational failures observed by Schwartz likely cut toward
underdeterrence: constitutional decisionmakers cannot be deterred by damage
awards of which they are unaware.107
Another concern, closely related, is that the deterrent effect of damage awards
may be weakened when damages awarded against one governmental branch or office
are paid by another.108 For example, suits involving law enforcement are often paid

103. These effects are not additive, and so they do not give rise to a threat of
overdeterrence: when compensatory damages are sufficient to make injured parties and
communities whole, there should be no negative spillover political consequences of
constitutional wrongdoing.
104. See Levinson, supra note 25, at 364 (discussing a range of political internalization
problems related to the tyranny of the majority).
105. See id.
106. See, e.g., Joanna C. Schwartz, Myths and Mechanics of Deterrence: The Role of
Lawsuits in Law Enforcement Decisionmaking, 57 UCLA L. Rev. 1023 (2010); see also PAUL
CHEVIGNY, THE EDGE OF THE KNIFE 102 (1995) (reporting that neither the L.A. nor the N.Y.C.
police department appeared to respond to constitutional liability with material policy changes).
107. It is also possible that ignorance could lead to overdeterrence; for example,
policymakers may have an exaggerated idea of the liability risks their department faces.
108. Michael T. Morley, Public Law at the Cathedral: Enjoining the
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from the general funds of governments rather than by the law enforcement agencies
directly. Although some such costs of constitutional wrongdoing may trickle down
from the general funds to the agencies in question, any disconnect between who pays
and who commits the tort is likely to result in underdeterrence: departmental
policymakers have less incentive to make changes in response to costs borne by
departments other than their own. Recent research, however, has blunted the force of
this concern. In a nationwide study, Joanna Schwartz revealed that settlements and
judgments are not, in fact, usually paid from the general funds of jurisdictions—and,
additionally, that more than half of law enforcement agencies financially contributed
to judgments and settlements for which they were responsible.109
Moreover, these concerns are both mitigated by the reliance of states on private
insurance to pay settlements: even if state policymakers are unaware of the direct
costs of constitutional wrongdoing (because of their information-collection failures,
because of general fund structural issues, or because of a broad-based agnosticism
toward optimal deterrence), their insurance companies pay close attention, passing
along the costs of riskier practices to the governmental departments in the form of
higher premiums.110 In fact, as John Rappaport notes in An Insurance-Based
Typology of Police Misconduct, best practices resulting from cost-internalization in
the constitutional context are increasingly being driven by these insurers, which
demand departmental policy shifts to minimize perceived liability.111 It may,
therefore, be unnecessary for state policymakers to understand the direct
constitutional costs of their policies; so long as the costs of insurance policies
accurately reflect the constitutional liability incurred by the state, policymakers will
indirectly internalize those costs in their decision-making.112 There are likely

Government, 35 CARDOZO L. REV. 2453, 2468 (2014) (“[M]any agencies are not required to
pay large damage awards out of their own budgets; rather, such judgments typically are paid
from the general fund of the municipality, state, or federal government.”); NAT’L RSCH.
COUNCIL, FAIRNESS AND EFFECTIVENESS IN POLICING: THE EVIDENCE 279 (Wesley Skogan &
Kathleen Frydl eds., 2004) (explaining how “damages in these suits are . . . not even paid out
from the police budget but out of general city funds”); SAMUEL WALKER, THE NEW WORLD OF
POLICE ACCOUNTABILITY 33 (Claudia A. Hoffman, Edward Meidenbauer & Jerry Westby,
eds., 2005) (“[O]ne agency of government (the police) perpetrates the harm, another agency
defends it in court (the law department), and a third agency writes the check (the treasurer).”).
But see Schwartz, supra note 102, at 1298. One closely related concern is that “government
officials will not always be able to influence the conduct of low-level government actors that
interact with the public and are most likely to be named as defendants.” Id. at 1152; cf.
SCHUCK, supra note 42, at 125–26.
109. Schwartz, supra note 102.
110. Id. at 1163–64; John Rappaport, An Insurance-Based Typology of Police Misconduct,
2016 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 369 (2016) (noting that “nearly all” law enforcement agencies rely on
private insurers for constitutional liability payments).
111. Rappaport, supra note 110, at 1163–64.
112. See id.; Schwartz, supra note 102, at 1149 (“Accordingly, pressures and obligations
imposed by outside insurers are an important and underappreciated consequence of liability
for smaller law enforcement agencies.”). The nation’s largest cities are predominantly selfinsured, but such departments also tend to be more sophisticated (and less indifferent) toward
the liability costs of policing. Id.

594

INDIANA LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 96:571

inefficiencies in such a system.113 Filtering the costs of constitutional liability
through an insurer may not always result in accurate cost assessment by departmental
policymakers.114 But there is no reason to believe that such inaccuracies are
systemically biased toward either underdeterrence or overdeterrence.
3. Uneven Enforcement
Third, successful constitutional litigation may be too sporadic or haphazard to
sufficiently deter constitutional wrongdoing.115 As is the case in the context of private
law torts, many of those who are harmed choose not to sue for reasons unrelated to
the merits of their claims—such as, for example, for fear of retaliation.116 Moreover,
many potential plaintiffs who would otherwise sue are barred by the various
immunity doctrines that apply to constitutional litigation—including not only
qualified immunity, but absolute immunity for officials performing judicial,
prosecutorial, or legislative functions.117 On top of these immunities, the Court’s
jurisprudence in this context is rife with other obstacles for plaintiffs—from
potentially heightened pleading standards under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8,118
to the procedural due process doctrine,119 to the increasing unavailability of
attorney’s fees for § 1983 litigation.120 Thus, numerous plaintiffs harmed by

113. See Kenneth S. Abraham, Cost Internalization, Insurance, and Toxic Tort
Compensation Funds, 2 VA. J. NAT. RES. L. 123, 125 (1982) (discussing issues, including moral
hazard, with insurance in the context of toxic torts).
114. See, e.g., Rappaport, supra note 110 (discussing a number of ways in which insurancebased civil rights regulation fails); Andrea Cann Chandrasekher, Empirically Validating the
Police Liability Insurance Claim, 130 HARV. L. REV. F. 233, 235 (2017) (arguing for the
necessity of empirically testing Professor Rappaport’s claims).
115. Chen, supra note 84, at 910; Meltzer, supra note 26, at 284; Joanna C. Schwartz, What
Police Learn from Lawsuits, 33 CARDOZO L. REV. 841, 863–64 (2012) (discussing a Bureau
of Justice statistics report suggesting that people who believe they have been mistreated by the
police only sue approximately one percent of the time).
116. See Anthony G. Amsterdam, Perspectives on the Fourth Amendment, 58 MINN. L.
REV. 349, 430 (1974); Caleb Foote, Tort Remedies for Police Violations of Individual Rights,
39 MINN. L. REV. 493, 500 (1955); cf. id. at 508 (discussing the issues that incarcerated
individuals face in bringing civil suits); see also Meltzer, supra note 26, at 284.
117. Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547 (1967) (judicial immunity); Imbler v. Pachtman, 424
U.S. 409 (1976) (prosecutorial immunity); Tenney v. Brandhove, 341 U.S. 367, 372–76 (1951)
(legislative immunity); see also Alan K. Chen, The Facts About Qualified Immunity, 55
EMORY L.J. 229, 232 (2006) (arguing that qualified immunity is approaching absolute
immunity). For a discussion of uneven enforcement in the private law context, much of which
also applies here, see Catherine M. Sharkey, Punitive Damages as Societal Damages,
113 YALE L.J. 347, 366 (2003).
118. Chen, supra note 84, at 912 (arguing that Iqbal’s requirement that the plaintiff “plead
factual matter that, if taken as true, states a claim that . . . [the official defendants] deprived
him of his clearly established constitutional rights” establishes a higher level of specificity for
constitutional claims (alteration in original) (emphasis in original) (quoting Ashcroft v. Iqbal,
556 U.S. 662, 666 (2009)).
119. Id. at 913 (pointing out several ways in which the Court’s due process decisions
disadvantage § 1983 litigation).
120. Farrar v. Hobby, 506 U.S. 103, 115 (1992) (refusing to award attorney’s fees for a
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constitutional violations will never sue, and numerous plaintiffs harmed by
constitutional violations who do sue will never recover. The result is systemic
underdeterrence: these practical and legal obstacles to recovery depress the riskadjusted costs of litigation. If only a small fraction of victims of constitutional
wrongdoing ultimately recover, compensatory damages alone will fall significantly
short of what is necessary to deter wrongdoing adequately.
4. Switching Costs
A fourth concern is that indirect costs in this context, such as the cost of averting
wrongdoing (retraining and so forth) and of the litigation itself, may influence the
deterrent effect of constitutional litigation. Policies that might be optimal in a costless world could nevertheless be discouraged by such switching costs. For example,
a new program that will yield $100,000 in benefits and $10,000 in risk-adjusted
compensatory damages is desirable, at least from an economic standpoint. But if
switching to the program requires sufficiently expensive retraining or if it is likely to
give rise to protracted litigation (adding >$90,000 in switching costs), the department
might reasonably decide not to make the switch. The influence of switching costs on
the effects of constitutional litigation can tilt toward either overdeterrence or
underdeterrence: litigation-related costs will add to the deterrent value of a suit,
potentially leading to overdeterrence; retraining-related costs, on the other hand,
detract from the benefits of a change, potentially leading to underdeterrence.
***

These critiques often lead to a sort of fatalism about constitutional deterrence:
because constitutional litigation’s impact on wrongdoing is complicated, deterrence
should be abandoned as a policy goal of constitutional torts (and then, presumably,
largely ignored).121 But protecting constitutional rights is no less important in
jurisdictions in which police departments are partially ignorant of or indifferent to
the constitutional costs of their policies. Nor is the societal toll of overdeterrence
diminished when political considerations lead the state to undervalue certain benefits
of its policies. So long as constitutional tort suits remain a colorable path to recovery,
litigation will continue to deter to some extent.122 And that deterrence is likely either
to sweep too broadly or to fall short. Irrespective of the difficulty of obtaining such

recovery of nominal damages); Buckhannon Bd. & Care Home, Inc. v. W. Va. Dep’t of Health
& Hum. Res., 532 U.S. 598, 605 (2001) (refusing to award attorney’s fees when the lawsuit
prompts a voluntary change in state policy); see generally Chen, supra note 84, at 915
(discussing the Court’s growing reluctance to award attorney’s fees in the context of
constitutional litigation).
121. The compensatory purpose of constitutional torts is regularly treated likewise.
122. Carlson v. Green, 446 U.S. 14, 21 (1980) (“It is almost axiomatic that the threat of
damages has a deterrent effect.”); see also Richard Frankel, Regulating Privatized
Government Through § 1983, 76 U. CHI. L. REV. 1449, 1515 (2009); John T. Parry, Judicial
Restraints on Illegal State Violence: Israel and the United States, 35 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L.
73, 11–15 (2002); Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409 (1976).
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a goal, it is therefore important for constitutional tort law to be well tailored to
achieve an optimal amount of litigation.123
III. DECISION-MAKING BIASES
Viewing constitutional torts through the instrumentalist lens of private law torts
points also—through both its interpretive framework and the contrasts that it
underscores between these two respective types of lawsuits—to another problem in
this context: biases of state decisionmakers will distort the deterrent effect of
constitutional tort damage awards.
Since its creation as part of the Ku Klux Klan Act of 1871 (“Klan Act”), a central
aim of constitutional tort law has been to remedy the biases of state actors.124 The
Klan had imposed its own “legal regime” across the South from 1868 to 1871, acting
through vigilantes and members holding official positions in government to unravel
the reforms introduced following the conclusion of the Civil War.125 The Klan Act
specifically targeted such discriminatory animus, “aim[ing] to break the rebellion,
restore order to the South, and vindicate the rights of Freedmen.”126 On the other
hand, private law torts spring mainly from the common law and most typically
concern circumstances in which no more than negligence is at issue.127 Reflecting
this, Oliver Wendell Holmes (as well as subsequent scholars) rooted the development
of tort law in the need to balance business interests against the harms that business
can create.128 Despite these foundational differences, constitutional tort law has
borrowed its central deterrence remedy—compensatory damage awards—from
private law torts with little examination and no modification to account for any such

123. Cf. Meltzer, supra note 26, at 286 (“The Supreme Court has recognized the
shortcomings of traditional tort remedies—and has accordingly embraced [different]
deterrence remedies—most clearly in criminal cases like Hillery and Mapp.”).
124. See, e.g., Eric A. Harrington, Judicial Misuse of History and § 1983: Toward a
Purpose-Based Approach, 85 TEX. L. REV. 999, 1006 (2007) (discussing § 1983); McLaughlin
v. Florida, 379 U.S. 184, 192 (1964) (discussing the Fourteenth Amendment); S. REP.
NO. 1011, 94th Cong., 2d Sess.-94, at 6, (1976), as reprinted in 1976 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
NEWS C.C.A.N. 5908, 5913 (discussing § 1988).
125. Harrington, supra note 124, at 1005–06.
126. Id. at 1006.
127. O. W. HOLMES, JR., THE COMMON LAW 111 (1881) (noting that the basis for tort
liability is the failure “to use such care as a prudent man would under the circumstances”).
Constitutional torts are not all intentional torts, see Gilles, supra note 89, at 857, and bias can
also influence negligence, see infra Part III, but this distinction nevertheless illustrates an
important difference between the purpose and circumstance of constitutional and private law
torts.
128. Id. HOLMES, supra note 127 (noting also that this essential theory of negligence was
established through judicial grants of immunity seeking to benefit businessmen and business
enterprises); see also, e.g., LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, A HISTORY OF AMERICAN LAW 300 (2d
ed. 1985) (examining the history of tort liability and concluding that it was driven by the
Industrial Revolution, “to the age of engines and machines . . . [that] have a marvelous capacity
to cripple and maim their servants”).
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distinctions.129
This Part defines and describes bias, providing a foundation for understanding the
scope of bias’s impact on decision-making in the constitutional context. By
influencing the judgment of state actors, bias may distort the systemic effect of
compensatory damage awards, skewing the balance between the competing interests
at stake.
A. Bias’s Many Influences
For purposes of this Article, the term “bias” describes a disposition that leads to
an incorrect or improper valuation of an action’s costs or benefits.130 Bias need not
be contemptible to influence the deterrent effect of constitutional litigation—a
policymaker may, for example, be biased toward a discredited interrogation method,
like polygraph evidence.131 But when suboptimal policy determinations are based on
innocent mistakes, like a misplaced faith in the reliability of polygraphs, the damage
done to the underlying deterrence interests is no less great than when policy
miscalculations stem from invidious motives.
Bias influences deterrence in three primary ways. First, bias may contribute to
misconceptions around key facts or assumptions—like in the polygraph example. In
effect, this form of bias taints the decision in question. This can be illustrated by
returning yet again to the chokehold hypothetical: Imagine, now, that the police
department in question is predominantly white and is policing a predominantly nonwhite neighborhood. Such a department should not pursue a chokehold policy that
produces $80,000 in benefits and $100,000 in costs. But what if the relevant
decisionmaker in the department believes, as a result of her racial biases, that the
population in question is more violent than is actually the case, and that the
chokehold policy will therefore produce $120,000 in benefits? Such a department
will proceed with a chokehold policy that, under efficient deterrence theory, it should
reject—because racial bias leads the relevant decisionmaker to overvalue the
presumptive benefits of the policy.

129. Private law torts may not, of course, be entirely untouched by such influences. But for
a variety of reasons, prejudice and other bias presents a greater concern in the context of
constitutional wrongdoing. Private investors, for example, have a strong self-interest in
ensuring that firm managers do not act irrationally at the cost of firm profits, and so firm
managers who fall victim to decision-making biases will be replaced. See, e.g., Edward Rubin,
Commentary, Rational States? 83 VA. L. REV. 1433, 1438 (1997); Levinson, supra note 25,
at 355. And those firms that fail to successfully winnow out biased managers will eventually
fail, leading to a sort of market-based natural selection that will favor firms that effectively
guard against bias. Id. Still, the impact of bias on private law decision-making has also been
overlooked. I will explore this question in a subsequent article.
130. This is, essentially, a reformulation of Kenneth Arrow’s widely used definition of
discrimination as “the valuation in the market place of personal characteristics of the worker
that are unrelated to worker productivity.” TITO BOERI & JAN VAN OURS, Antidiscrimination
Legislation in THE ECONOMICS OF IMPERFECT LABOR MARKETS 95 (2d ed. 2013).
131. See Renée McDonald Hutchins, You Can’t Handle the Truth! Trial Juries and
Credibility, 44 SETON HALL L. REV. 505, 529 n.99 (2014). Such a policymaker may overvalue
the benefits of using polygraph evidence, leading to an overuse of polygraph testing.
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Second, bias can create nonpecuniary value—like the illicit joy that springs from
harming a member of a disfavored community—that will directly add to the costs or
benefits that underlie constitutional decision-making.132 For example, a sheriff who
derives racist utility from a chokehold policy that injures a particular racial minority
will be less deterred by the threat of compensatory damages than a sheriff who does
not.133 Similarly, a sheriff who answers to a community that derives, in the aggregate,
net racist utility from a chokehold policy that injures a particular racial minority
group will be less deterred by the threat of compensatory damages than a sheriff who
does not: even if the sheriff herself is not racist, the political benefits of appeasing
her electorate will influence whatever decisions she makes.
Finally, when the nonpecuniary value that springs from bias influences
individuals making decisions with collective impacts, it will lead to agency-cost
problems.134 This is because individual decisionmakers do not experience all of the
societal benefits and costs of their actions, but they are fully affected by any personal
benefits and costs. Bias-derived utility can therefore create circumstances in which
the policy that maximizes utility for the individual decisionmaker is not the policy
that maximizes utility for society.135 In the above chokehold hypothetical, for
example, because the sheriff in question will only personally experience a fraction
of the chokehold policy’s societal benefits (say, $800) and costs ($1,000), she need
only derive a small amount of personal racism-related utility (>$200) to implement
an inefficient policy: then the personal benefits ($800 + >$200) of the policy would
exceed its personal costs ($1,000). Among other things, this illustrates the outsized
impact that biases can have on decision-making; in this example, the sheriff need
only derive $201 in personal utility from her bias to choose a policy that results in a
net societal loss of $20,000 in utility.
B. Are Bias’s Effects Improper?
When bias undermines the decision-making process, by corrupting assumptions
or by creating agency-cost problems, it presents a serious threat to the constitutional
regulatory scheme. There are no acceptable circumstances from the standpoint of
optimal deterrence in which bias leads decisionmakers to incorrectly value the costs
or benefits of their actions or to maximize individual utility at the expense of societal
utility. Any scheme reliant on deterrence depends also on the underlying decisionmaking of the actors in question. And when a factor like bias systemically taints those

132. This is analogous to the “taste for discrimination” described by Gary Becker in the
employment context; the utility that springs from bias will put a thumb on the scale of
deterrence. GARY S. BECKER, ACCOUNTING FOR TASTES 140–41 (1998); see also BERNARD E.
HARCOURT, AGAINST PREDICTION at 111–18 (2007) (mapping this theory on to police profiling
determinations).
133. Whenever the net value of bias-derived utility is positive, [benefit-derived utility] +
[bias-derived utility] > [benefit-derived utility].
134. Pecuniary effects can also give rise to agency-cost problems. See, e.g.,
Robert A. McBride, Policing for Profit: How Urban Municipalities’ Focus on Revenue Has
Undermined Law Enforcement Legitimacy, 9 FAULKNER L. REV. 329, 331 (2018).
135. Cf. Coffee, supra note 37, at 1349 (outlining this problem in the context of mass torts).
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decisions—especially when the result is uniform underdeterrence or
overdeterrence—it undermines the whole system.
It is less instantly clear, however, whether the utility that is directly produced from
bias must be excluded from calculations of optimal deterrence: from a strictly
utilitarian standpoint, the joy that a racist derives from her bigotry, as despicable that
preference may be, also adds to the overall societal utility of the action in question.136
Paradoxically, this would mean that optimal deterrence sometimes favors a policy
because of, and not in spite of, that policy’s racist (or sexist, or xenophobic, etc.)
consequences.
Such a result is plainly untenable. Constitutional tort suits exist to enforce the
policy aims of § 1983 and the Constitution, not to blindly maximize utility. Adopting
an absolutist version of utilitarianism in this context, therefore, makes little sense. A
more sensible approach may, instead, be to look to the policies underlying § 1983
and the Constitution in determining what kinds of utility should factor into
calculations of optimal deterrence. Utility derived from bias would not be
incorporated into cost-benefit decision-making when doing so would thwart these
policy goals.
There are a number of biases that might give rise to such troubling utility.
Classical prejudices, for example—racism, sexism, xenophobia, religious animosity,
and other biases that relate to identity—are inherently inconsistent with the
Constitution’s anti-discrimination goals. Indeed, it was the need for a remedy against
racially biased state actors that gave rise to § 1983; and the Fourteenth Amendment’s
Equal Protection Clause was borne out of fears of racial prejudice.137 As such, it
should not matter how much utility a state actor derives from discriminating on the
basis of race, sex, national origin, religion, etc., for purposes of calculating whether
the costs of that discriminatory action outweigh its benefit.
Viewpoint-based biases—biases springing from the tendency to, intentionally or
unintentionally, disfavor perspectives with which one disagrees—are likewise
troubling from the standpoint of constitutional tort policy.138 When the state
considers how aggressively to police a protest or what potentially unwholesome
content to censor, the degree to which the relevant state actors sympathize with the
underlying viewpoint may influence the state’s ultimate determination. Yet as the
Supreme Court has made clear: “If there is a bedrock principle underlying the First
Amendment, it is that the government may not prohibit the expression of an idea

136. Cf. ROBERT NOZICK, ANARCHY, STATE, AND UTOPIA 41 (1974) (recognizing the
theoretical challenge posed by “utility monsters,” individuals who get “enormously greater
sums of gains in utility from any sacrifice of others than these others lose”).
137. Section 1983 was passed as part of the Ku Klux Klan Act of 1871 to “target[] the
Klan, including those members holding official positions in government.” Harrington, supra
note 124, at 1006 (2007). For a description of the Fourteenth Amendment’s foundations, see
McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S. 184, 192 (1964) (noting the “historical fact that the central
purpose of the Fourteenth Amendment was to eliminate racial discrimination emanating from
official sources in the States”). Both § 1983 and the Fourteenth Amendment are phrased
vaguely, presumably to act as a guard against discrimination more broadly.
138. Viewpoint bias may also result in favoritism displayed toward perspectives with
which one agrees.
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simply because society finds the idea itself offensive or disagreeable.”139 Allowing
the utility that springs from suppressing a disagreeable viewpoint to justify a policy
that suppresses that viewpoint would thwart the First Amendment’s purposes.
Not all biases that concerningly affect constitutional decision-making are, of
course, invidious. Take, for example, bias toward law and order. The utility that
results from the promotion of law and order is a natural, expected, and—at least to
some extent—desirable goal of policing and governance. Yet an officer who
overvalues the benefits of orderliness will nevertheless be suboptimally deterred
from wrongdoing when the effect of that wrongdoing is to increase order.140
Although such a mistake may be innocent or even well meaning, the effect—
underdeterrence—is still undesirable.141 Similarly, departmental solidarity, exhibited
through the “thin blue line,” is an organizational strength of many service
organizations, contributing to a cohesiveness and comradery that draws many to the
field.142 But it also leads officers to be biased toward their colleagues—by, for
example, adopting a “code of silence” in the face of accusations of wrongdoing—
and therefore toward behavior that fails to maximize overall societal utility.143 When
these biases undermine the decision-making process, by tainting policymakers’
underlying assumptions or by creating agency-cost problems, it does not matter if
the underlying reason was invidious or anodyne.
C. Bias and Other Deterrence Skews
Of course, bias does not affect deterrence in isolation; it will often work in
conjunction with other factors that weigh on the deterrent impact of constitutional

139. Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 414 (1989).
140. For instance, strategically citing some of those who jaywalk may reflect an
appropriate valuation of law and order as it applies to jaywalking, whereas detaining every
jaywalker, using violence when necessary, likely overvalues the need to ensure adherence to
this minor traffic law. Other than recognizing that absolute and ruthless enforcement of all
laws will not be universally desirable, this Article does not take a position as to what specific
laws demand what specific levels of enforcement.
141. Even such seemingly innocuous biases might stand in opposition to the Constitution’s
goals. As the Supreme Court has recognized in the context of the First Amendment, “a certain
amount of unrest and disorder is a price that must be paid lest there be only noncontroversial
or impotent protest.” Note, Equity on the Campus: The Limits of Injunctive Regulation of
University Protest, 80 YALE L.J. 987, 1005 (1971); City of Houston v. Hill, 482 U.S. 451,
471–72 (1987). Yet when sufficiently strong, the utility that springs from preferences for law
and order may outweigh the costs that result from suppressing protest—leading optimal
deterrence to favor the suppression of speech that the Constitution seeks to protect. Taken to
its furthest extreme, it is possible to imagine a society in which government propaganda has
convinced the broader population that upholding laws and maintaining order is sufficiently
valuable such that the costs of any constitutional wrongdoing in pursuit of that goal are
overwhelmed by the brainwashed public’s utility gained from law and order.
142. Ann C. Hodges & Justin Pugh, Crossing the Thin Blue Line: Protecting Law
Enforcement Officers Who Blow the Whistle, 52 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. ONLINE 1, 10 (2018)
(describing the unofficial “code of silence” common throughout law enforcement when it
comes to testimony that may implicate a fellow officer).
143. See also Armacost, supra note 42, at 454.
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litigation.
This includes, first, the problem of economic costs translating unevenly into
political costs.144 Indeed, one circumstance in which uneven translation is
particularly likely to arise is when bias is present.145 One factor that may influence a
population’s sensitivity to a tax increase is the underlying reasons for the increase in
question;146 a community with racist preferences may be more willing to tolerate a
tax increase when it results from a policy that injures a disfavored population—
thereby diminishing the political costs of such a policy.147
Second, bias can aggravate the sorts of information-related problems that lead
policymakers to fail to account for the liability costs of their decisions.148 Implicit in
the goal of carefully monitoring policymaking liability is the idea that there should
be checks on official policymaking. Law-and-order bias and intra-departmental bias,
however, each weigh in favor of granting officials greater discretion—and therefore
toward less oversight.149 Similarly, policymakers may be less likely to implement
necessary information-gathering processes when a disfavored community would be
the primary beneficiary of careful tracking.150 The likelihood that a government
office is properly tracking its liability may therefore be tied, at least in part, to the
biases held within that department. Moreover, when a department does not have
adequate processes to track its liability, and deterrence therefore relies on individual
officials noticing liability awards, bias may influence what awards are noticed or
remembered. A state official biased against a religious minority, for example, may
be less likely to remember (or “remember”) damage awards springing from policies
that harm that minority population, thereby decreasing the deterrent effect of such
liability.151
Third, bias will lead to even greater unevenness in the pursuit and success of these
suits, which will also have a distorting effect on the resulting deterrence. Bias in
official decision-making will often reflect bias in the justice system and/or the
community. This, in turn, will influence what cases are brought and what cases

144. See Levinson, supra note 25.
145. This is beyond the scope of Levinson’s article. Id.
146. See, e.g., Andrew D. Appleby, Pay at the Pump: How $11 Per Gallon Gasoline Can
Solve the United States’ Most Pressing Challenges, 40 CUMB. L. REV. 3, 57 (2009).
147. This can cut both ways. In a racism-sensitive community like Portland, Oregon, the
fact that an unconstitutional policy appears to have been motivated by racial bias might
amplify the political consequences of any resultant economic damages.
148. Schwartz, supra note 106.
149. See supra Section II.D.
150. This sort of bias-induced carelessness may well have played a significant role in the
Flint water crisis. See, e.g., Andrew Buncombe, Flint Water Crisis: Race ‘Was Factor’ in
Authorities’ Slow and Misleading Response, Says City’s Black Mayor, INDEPENDENT (May 28,
2018), https://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/americas/flint-water-crisis-michigan
-racism-city-mayor-karen-weaver-police-a8369981.html [https://perma.cc/93VM-AML9].
151. This, also, can cut both ways. A Bosnian-American policymaker, for example, may
be particularly likely to remember any constitutional liability that results from a policy that
harms Bosnian-Americans, thereby inflating the relative deterrence effectuated by such
awards. See, e.g., Henri Tajfel & John Turner, An Integrative Theory of Intergroup
Conflict, in THE SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY OF INTERGROUP RELATIONS 33 (William G. Austin &
Stephen Worchel eds., 1979) (discussing how individuals favor members of their own group).
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succeed—thereby changing the risk-adjusted cost of litigation. When a victim of
constitutional wrongdoing ascribes to a disfavored viewpoint, for example, she may
face a relatively uphill battle in obtaining counsel or in succeeding at trial152: the
subset of Massachusetts-licensed attorneys who would consider representing a
chapter of the KKK in a Takings claim is relatively small; and a typical
Massachusetts jury is probably less likely to find in favor of a KKK victim, all else
equal.153 Bias’s influence on liability determinations, moreover, extends beyond
simply coloring the sympathies of jurors: numerous constitutional torts include legal
elements vulnerable to bias. Whether police have used excessive force, for example,
turns on, among other things, the factfinder’s assessment of how much danger the
suspect in question presented to the arresting officer(s). A juror who has internalized
an unfounded fear of a particular racial group will, because of her bias, be more likely
to judge as reasonable an officer’s use of force against a member of that group.154
Finally, the amount of stigma or even stress that results from a constitutional tort
suit will depend, similarly, on workplace and community biases. A public health
official accused of overzealously quarantining immigrants from a certain country
may face little stigma—and might even be celebrated—in a town in which the
immigrant population in question is disfavored or distrusted. Sheriff Joe Arpaio, for
example, appears to have politically benefited from at least some of his unruly and
constitutionally dubious stances and actions. Such effects cannot be universalized; a
constitutional violation that is taboo in one community may be viewed as
unremarkable or even desirable in another.155

152. These effects will also cut both ways. Even when it is not legally relevant, bias may
be a persuasive part of a plaintiff’s narrative, and the apparent presence of certain types of bias
in constitutional wrongdoing may induce high-quality plaintiffs’ firms, like the Southern
Poverty Law Center, to take a case. In such circumstances, bias may give rise to contradictory
effects on deterrence: official bias may create decision-making flaws that lead toward less
deterrence while also increasing the likelihood of litigation and liability, thereby leading to
more deterrence. Offsetting effects will be most common when official biases run counter to
community preferences; whereas, the effects of bias are most likely to compound when the
biases of governmental policymakers reflect biases in the broader community.
153. This isn’t to say that bias will always or even usually deprive such victims of a chance
at redress. But by limiting the pool of potential attorneys and by precoloring the sympathies
of the jury, bias will serve as an additional obstacle to liability judgments, thereby skewing
the risk-adjusted costs of litigation.
154. Cf. Isabel Wilkerson, Mike Brown’s Shooting and Jim Crow Lynchings Have Too
Much in Common. It’s Time for America to Own Up, GUARDIAN (Aug. 25, 2014), http://www
.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2014/aug/25/mike-brown-shooting-jim-crow-lynchings-incommon [https://perma.cc/FEW6-Q4FT] (discussing Mike Brown and other instances in
which internalized racism influenced and then “justified” state action). By this same token,
bias may also contribute to the calculation of compensatory damages or settlements.
155. This, too, illustrates qualified immunity’s clumsiness: qualified immunity applies
with equal force irrespective of whether or to what extent bias influences the stress and stigma
of litigation—including in circumstances in which community biases result in the celebration
of those accused of constitutional wrongdoing.
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D. Bias and Bias-Based Torts
Bias is unique among factors that distort the constitutional tort system insofar as
it is a required element of some constitutional torts: plaintiffs in such cases will not
be able to recover without proving bias. The inclusion of bias as an element of a
claim in some torts does not, however, in any way mitigate its systemic influence on
deterrence. To the contrary, bias is especially a concern in such circumstances.
Many constitutional violations do not directly turn on the motivations of the state
actor in question. In First Amendment speech cases, for example, the legal inquiry
often involves whether a facially non-discriminatory speech regulation is narrowly
tailored to a significant government interest—a question in which bias is not an
element.156 On the other hand, some constitutional violations do require a showing
of some impermissible bias such as racial animus or hostility to speech.157 Section
1985(3), for example, provides a federal cause of action, similar to § 1983, for
victims targeted because of “racial, or perhaps otherwise class-based, invidiously
discriminatory animus”;158 it is impossible to succeed under § 1985(3) without
showing bias.
For claims that do not involve bias as an element, bias’s influence on deterrence
is straightforward: when present, bias will weigh on the cost-benefit analysis, thereby
skewing constitutional litigation’s deterrent effect. The question is less intuitive (but
equally straightforward) for claims for which bias is a required element. On the one
hand, the deterrent effect of such bias torts reaches only biased potential tortfeasors.
But so long as damage awards remain predominantly compensatory, the inclusion of
bias as an element of the tort will do nothing to mitigate bias’s distorting effect on
deterrence. Indeed, the key difference between bias-required torts and biasindifferent torts is that when bias is an element of liability, there will be no possible
tortfeasor for whom bias has not distorted the deterrent effect of constitutional
litigation.
This may be illustrated with an example. Imagine two police departments
considering two policies, one of which is justified largely on racial animus. If these
policies create identical (let’s say $80,000 in) legitimate societal utility, and each of
these policies give rise to identical (let’s say $100,000 in) risk-adjusted litigation
costs, then efficient deterrence suggests identical results: that the policies should not
be pursued. The question at the heart of efficient deterrence (do the policy’s costs—
$100,000—exceed its benefits—$80,000?) is not affected by the elements of the
underlying tort. And insofar as the costs of a policy largely take the form of
compensatory damage awards—which are determined by the nature of, and not the
reasons for, the policy’s harm—the court’s recognition of bias as an element of the
wrong in question will ensure no additional deterrence: the fact that one department
was motivated by racial animus in adopting an identically harmful policy is

156. See United States v. O’Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 377 (1968); see also, e.g., Graham v.
Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 397 (1989) (describing the Fourth Amendment’s objective
reasonableness inquiry that does not turn on the actual motivations (improper or not) of the
officer in question).
157. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3).
158. Bray v. Alexandria Women’s Health Clinic, 506 U.S. 263, 268 (1993) (quoting
Griffin v. Breckenridge, 403 U.S. 88, 102 (1971)).
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immaterial for purposes of calculating compensatory damages.159 Indeed, because
bias is a difficult-to-prove additional element for liability, bias torts may provide less
deterrence than non-bias torts; all else equal, including bias as a required element of
liability will increase the risk of nonrecovery and thereby decrease the risk-adjusted
cost of litigation.160
IV. TAILORING DAMAGES TO DETERRENCE
Treating constitutional torts more like private law torts helps clarify a number of
problems. But it also suggests the possibility of a uniform solution. Each of these
problems—the stress and stigma of litigation, economic-political cost translation
effects, bias, and so forth—troubles the operation of the constitutional tort system by
amplifying or diminishing the deterrent effect of compensatory damage awards. Such
additive or detractive influences can, however, be offset by increasing or decreasing
the damage award in question. Indeed, private law tort theory offers a number of
proposals that do exactly this, including damage multipliers, damage caps, and
proportional recovery.161
A. Countering Underdeterrence Through Exemplary Damages
When bias, governmental cost internalization failures, or something else renders
compensatory damage awards inadequate, exemplary damages present a promising
mechanism for nevertheless ensuring the optimal effect of constitutional torts.162

159. Because bias’s skewing effect is exogenous to a policy’s harmfulness, even if bias
pushes decisionmakers toward actions that do more harm, and therefore give rise to more in
compensatory damages, underdeterrence will nevertheless result. A bias-motivated chokehold
policy giving rise to $110,000 in harms will only generate $110,000 in compensatory damages
(and therefore $110,000 in deterrence)—enough to internalize all of the policy’s harms but
none of bias’s influence.
160. It is possible that bias torts may be more likely to result in a judgment, or in higher
settlements—although the opposite may be true as well: judges and juries are generally
reluctant to formally recognize that a state actor was biased.
161. See, e.g., A. Mitchell Polinsky & Steven Shavell, Punitive Damages: An Economic
Analysis, 111 HARV. L. REV. 869, 890–91 (1998) (discussing advantages and disadvantages of
these respective mechanisms for tailoring damage awards).
162. See Smith v. Wade, 461 U.S. 30, 50 (1983) (recognizing the importance of the
availability of exemplary damages “if one assumes that there are substantial numbers of
officers who will not be deterred by compensatory damages”). The term ‘exemplary damages’
is typically used interchangeably with ‘punitive damages.’ To avoid the retributivist
connotations of ‘punitive,’ this Article uses ‘exemplary damages’ throughout. For others who
have noted this semantic confusion, see, for example, Ciraolo v. City of New York, 216 F.3d
236, 245 (2d Cir. 2000) (Calabresi, J., concurring) (noting that the term “‘punitive damages’ .
. . contributes greatly to . . . confusion” because it “improperly emphasizes the retributive
function of such extracompensatory damages at the expense of their multiplierdeterrent function”); Polinsky et al., supra note 161, at 890–91 (“[T]he adjective ‘punitive’
may sometimes be misleading. This is because extracompensatory damages may be needed
for deterrence purposes in circumstances in which the behavior of the defendant would not
call for punishment.”) (emphasis omitted); cf. Sharkey, supra note 117, at 364–65 (“[I]t makes
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This may be illustrated by returning, briefly, to this Article’s discussion of the
problem in Parts I and II. Optimal deterrence entails weighing a policy’s benefits [b]
against its costs [c]. A policy is justified under efficient deterrence theory when
[b]>[c]. Stress and stigma, bias, and so forth, however, skew this equation. When a
sheriff derives $10,000 in improper bias-related utility from a policy, for example,
she will consider whether [b] + $10,000 > [c].163 This Part proposes adding a
reciprocal amount of exemplary damages and thereby proportionally increasing the
costs of wrongdoing: under the proposed exemplary damages regime, the sheriff
would consider whether [b] + $10,000 > [c] + $10,000—i.e., whether [b]>[c]. Such
a reform could be applied to address any one factor, or any combination of factors,
that skews the systemic effect of constitutional torts.164
This use of exemplary damage awards resembles a Pigouvian tax correcting for
systemic failures in constitutional deterrence.165 The direct impact of such a remedy
would be to internalize one or more of these skewing effects in the manner described
above, preserving optimal deterrence. But direct deterrence will only reach parties
who know that they are so influenced. Although a sheriff who recognizes that his
decision is motivated in part by bias-derived utility can anticipate and incorporate
the cost of bias-related exemplary damages into his decision-making, a policymaker
who mistakenly believes that a community is more dangerous than it actually is will
not understand that her belief is mistaken, let alone influenced by bias. She will
therefore not be swayed by the possibility of any resulting bias-related damages in
her decisions.
This may not, however, be a major concern: exemplary damages will also give
rise to indirect, institutional effects that will reach even unknowingly or
unconsciously affected decisionmakers. This will be true if vicarious liability is
adopted in this context, but it also will be true if the costs of these deterrence failures
continue to be imposed on states and municipalities through indemnification: either
way, exemplary damages serve as a powerful incentive to implement policies that

sense to entertain seriously the idea of a nonretributive rationale for punitive damages.”).
163. For a discussion of what it means for bias-derived utility to be “improper,” see supra
Section III.B. Given the prevalence of settlements in this context, it may not be possible to
tailor deterrence this precisely. Nevertheless, increasing the presumptive value of a judgment
will also increase the settlement value, and so the prevalence of settlements will not necessarily
thwart this proposal.
164. Indeed, using exemplary damages to correct deterrence failures related to uneven
enforcement follows directly from the rich body of private law tort scholarship on the use of
damage multipliers in circumstances in which the risk of non-recovery undermines the
deterrence effect of compensatory awards. See generally, e.g., Polinksy et al., supra note 161
(proposing damage multipliers to account for risk-of-nonrecovery problems). When only half
of all constitutional wrongs result in a compensatory damage award, doubling the total
damages via exemplary damage awards will counteract the underdeterrence that would
otherwise result. See, e.g., id.; Robert D. Cooter, Punitive Damages for Deterrence: When and
How Much? 40 ALA. L. REV. 1143, 1148 (1989); Polinsky et al., supra note 161.
165. Pigouvian taxes are taxes on activities that generate negative externalities. See, e.g.,
Thomas Merrill & David M. Schizer, Energy Policy for an Economic Downturn: A Proposed
Petroleum Fuel Price Stabilization Plan, 27 YALE J. REG. 1, 4 (2010). Pigouvian taxes are
generally set to match the marginal cost of the externality in question so as to correct the
resulting market failure. Id.
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guard against even unconscious deterrence failures.166 A state that is indirectly
penalized for its health department’s failure to track its liability-related expenditures
will take steps to better track such costs; and a municipality that knows its hiring,
firing, supervising, and policymaking decisions each could give rise to bias-related
liability will take steps to moderate the influence of bias in and through such
decisions.167
B. Countering Overdeterrence Through Damage Reductions
Exemplary damages cannot, however, be used when faults in the constitutional
tort system lead to overdeterrence. This is because exemplary damages are a oneway ratchet: they only add to the costs of constitutional tort suits and therefore can
only increase their deterrence value. If exemplary damages function as a quasiPigouvian tax on state bias, this Article’s framework suggests the need also for a
Pigouvian subsidy-like reform: a way to decrease the deterrent effect of
constitutional litigation. Private tort law also provides several such mechanisms,
including damage proportional liability;168 when the stress and stigma of litigation,
bias, or some other factor appears likely to lead to overdeterrence, compensatory
damage awards should be accordingly reduced to below-compensatory levels.169
Such a reduction might appear to strike at constitutional tort law’s compensatory
purposes.170 To the extent that it does, this shouldn’t necessarily doom the proposal.
As the doctrine of qualified immunity makes clear, the Supreme Court, at least,

166. Armacost, supra note 42, at 505–06. Such an increased use of exemplary damages
could discourage the practice of indemnification. It seems unlikely, however, that holding
individual officers accountable for their departments’ policymaking failures will result in
fewer departments paying exemplary awards on their officers’ behalf. See generally Schwartz,
supra note 38, at 890 (observing that every single officer in her nationwide study was
indemnified for exemplary damages).
167. For example, research suggests that African Americans are less susceptible to antiAfrican American biases, and so ensuring that policies that impact predominantly AfricanAmerican communities are made by or in consultation with African-American policymakers
could be an effective step toward diminishing the influence of conscious and unconscious antiAfrican American biases. See, e.g., R. Richard Banks, Jennifer L. Eberhardt & Lee
Ross, Discrimination and Implicit Bias in a Racially Unequal Society, 94 CALIF. L. REV. 1169,
1190 (2006); Anthony G. Greenwald, Mark A. Oakes & Hunter G. Hoffman, Targets of
Discrimination: Effects of Race on Responses to Weapons Holders, 39 J. EXPERIMENTAL SOC.
PSYCHOL. 399 (2003); E. Ashby Plant, B. Michelle Peruche & David A. Butz, Eliminating
Automatic Racial Bias: Making Race Non-Diagnostic for Responses to Criminal Suspects, 41
J. EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCHOL. 141 (2005) (showing mixed success in training subjects to
minimize effects of this bias).
168. Damage caps, which are not Pigouvian-like, also will lead to such an end.
169. This would operate in the same manner as exemplary damages described above: when
bias detracts from the perceived benefits of a policy, for example, subtracting an equivalent
amount from the damages awarded will counterbalance its influence. Expressed
algorithmically, where [b] - $10,000 > [c], the costs could be adjusted such that [b] - $10,000
> [c] - $10,000, or [b] > [c].
170. Cf., e.g., Hardin v. Straub, 490 U.S. 536, 539 (1989) (identifying “§ 1983’s chief goals
[as] compensation and deterrence”).
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believes that overdeterrence in this context is a sufficiently serious concern to require
the sacrifice of some amount of otherwise deserved compensatory relief.171 Damage
caps and proportionally tailored liability demand less of a loss of compensation than
qualified immunity.172
Compromise may be unnecessary, though; it is possible to guard against
overdeterrence without sacrificing compensation. Looking again to the private law,
the doctrine of cy pres provides a possible model for a solution. Cy pres is an
equitable practice used in class actions, in which judges distribute portions of the
judgments or settlements to uninvolved charitable interests.173 Applying this general
principle—that equity sometimes demands decoupling the plaintiff’s recovery from
the judgment itself—exemplary damage awards from previous suits could be used to
create a common fund for offsetting downward adjustments to compensatory damage
awards.174 So long as underdeterrence is at least as big of a problem as
overdeterrence, the amounts of exemplary damages collected would be sufficient to
ensure that every injured plaintiff is made whole. Where, for example, a $10,000
exemplary damage award was necessary to internalize the effects of bias and ensure
optimal deterrence, this $10,000 would then be available in a subsequent case to
compensate an injured plaintiff for any reduction to her compensatory damage
award. In effect, therefore, deterrence-related exemplary damages would be used as
insurance dedicated to preserving the compensatory role of constitutional litigation
even when optimal deterrence militates that some plaintiffs receive subcompensatory relief.
There is nothing inherently problematic with using exemplary damages in this
manner. Plaintiffs have no moral or legal entitlement to exemplary damages awarded
to deter rather than to punish.175 Therefore, redistributing these awards would simply
deprive certain plaintiffs of what would otherwise be a windfall.176 Indeed, this

171. And, as Section IV.D discusses, this Article’s approach likely represents a more
effective and more efficient approach.
172. Another advantage of damage caps or proportionally reduced damage awards is that
they would still result in a judgment, thereby facilitating any expressive or civil recourserelated goals of the constitutional tort system. Cf. John C. P. Goldberg, The Constitutional
Status of Tort Law: Due Process and the Right to a Law for the Redress of Laws Wrongs, 115
YALE L. J. 524, 621–22 (2005).
173. See Chris J. Chasin, Comment, Modernizing Class Action Cy Pres Through
Democratic Inputs: A Return to Cy Pres Comme Possible, 163 U. PA. L. REV. 1463, 1469
(2015).
174. This proposal follows, generally, from private law scholarship on decoupling. See,
e.g., Albert Choi & Chris William Sanchirico, Should Plaintiffs Win What Defendants Lose?
Litigation Stakes, Litigation Effort, and the Benefits of Decoupling, 33 J. LEGAL STUD. 323
(2004); Mitchell Polinsky & Yeon-Koo Che, Decoupling Liability: Optimal Incentives for
Care and Litigation, 22 RAND J. ECON. 562 (1991); David Rosenberg, Decoupling
Deterrence and Compensation Functions in Mass Tort Class Actions for Future Loss, 88 VA.
L. REV. 1871 (2002).
175. Cf. Noah Smith-Drelich, Performative Causation, 93 S. CALIF. L. REV. 379 (2020)
(discussing theoretical justifications for proportional liability).
176. See, e.g., Sharkey, supra note 117, at 370 n.65 (“[T]hat the damages are paid to the
plaintiff is, from an economic standpoint, a detail. It is payment by the defendant that creates
incentives for more efficient resource use. The transfer of the money to the plaintiff affects his
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proposal would redistribute exemplary damages in a manner that facilitates tort
law’s—and, specifically, constitutional tort law’s—goals of deterrence and
compensation; defendants would pay an amount necessary to ensure that they are
optimally deterred while plaintiffs would receive an amount necessary to ensure that
they are fully compensated.177
C. Current Legal Status of Damage Tailoring
What, if any, aspects of this Article’s proposal can be adopted under existing law?
The answer is, surprisingly, a great deal: because qualified immunity screens out all
but intentional or reckless constitutional violations—which is conveniently also the
Supreme Court’s standard for awarding exemplary damages—exemplary damage
awards are currently available to amplify the deterrent effect in nearly every case that
survives to the liability stage of litigation.178 Reducing compensatory damages to
subcompensatory levels, on the other hand, may fall too far afield of anything
approved under the common law to be adopted without congressional intervention,
even if plaintiffs are nevertheless fully compensated through redistributed exemplary
awards. But this Article’s examination nevertheless suggests the need for some
reform in this respect.
1. Adding Deterrence Through Exemplary Damages
This Article’s proposal for exemplary damages can be largely adopted to
supplement qualified immunity under even a narrow and uncontroversial reading of
the Supreme Court’s standard for § 1983 damage awards: nearly any case that
survives qualified immunity will also satisfy the burden for exemplary damages.179
In Smith v. Wade, the Supreme Court held that punitive damages could be awarded
under § 1983 “when the defendant’s conduct is shown to be motivated by evil motive
or intent, or when it involves reckless or callous indifference to the federally
protected rights of others.”180 The “reckless or callous indifference” or “evil motive”
in question pertains to the tortfeasor’s “knowledge that [he] may be acting in
violation of federal law, not [his] awareness that [he] is engaging in

wealth but does not affect efficiency or value.” (footnote omitted) (quoting RICHARD A.
POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 78 (1972))).
177. This would also have the benefit of mitigating the tendency for exemplary damages
to incentivize frivolous litigation or to motivate plaintiffs to take insufficient precautions. See,
e.g., Polinsky et al., supra note 161, at 923.
178. If, however, the doctrine of qualified immunity is either substantially changed or
eliminated entirely, this Article’s proposal will have to remain limited largely to those
circumstances in which qualified immunity would have applied. Cf. Ciraolo v. City of New
York, 216 F.3d 236, 242 (2d Cir. 2000) (Calabresi, J., concurring) (calling for the Court to
revisit municipalities’ immunity to punitive damages); Gilles, supra note 89, at 871 (same).
179. The fact that few courts actually do award exemplary damages under § 1983 is not a
reflection of the limited permissibility of such awards; it instead reflects what is, this Article
suggests, an ill-informed practice of reserving exemplary damages for truly extraordinary
circumstances.
180. Smith v. Wade, 461 U.S. 30, 54–55 (1983).
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discrimination.”181 Put more simply, exemplary damages are permitted for reckless
or intentional violations of the law.
Qualified immunity, in turn, allows cases to proceed against only reckless or
intentional tortfeasors: “qualified immunity . . . provides ample protection to all but
the plainly incompetent or those who knowingly violate the law.”182 This means that
for all nonmunicipal defendants subject to damage awards,183 exemplary damages
are thus available.184
The primary doctrinal limitation on exemplary damages awarded for deterrence
purposes will instead be the Court’s due process jurisprudence. In State Farm Mutual
Automobile Insurance Co. v. Campbell, the Court imposed a de facto single-digit cap
on the ratio of exemplary damages to compensatory damages.185 Therefore, in the
event that optimal deterrence requires a ten-to-one or higher ratio of exemplary-tocompensatory damages, Campbell may stand as an obstacle to fully implementing
this Article’s proposed use of exemplary damages.186 More fundamentally, Philip
Morris USA v. Williams forbids the award of exemplary damages based on injuries
to nonparties.187 In some circumstances, this Article’s proposal would base
exemplary damages on the conduct of nonparties, which raises even greater due

181. Kolstad v. Am. Dental Ass’n, 527 U.S. 526, 535–36 (1999) (discussing and applying
the § 1983 standard set forth in Smith v. Wade, 461 U.S. at 30, 37, to § 1981 actions).
182. Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 335, 343 (1986). If there is any space between “plain[]
incompeten[ce]” and recklessness, it is small: for public officials, to violate “clearly
established” federal law approaches constituting recklessness per se. Id. at 349; see
Recklessness, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (Garner ed. 2005) (defining recklessness as
“[c]onduct whereby the actor does not desire harmful consequence but . . . foresees the
possibility and consciously takes the risk” or, alternatively, as “[a] state of mind in which a
person does not care about the consequences of his or her actions”).
183. Municipal defendants cannot assert qualified immunity, but they are also not subject
to exemplary damages. City of Newport v. Fact Concerts, Inc., 453 U.S. 247, 259–602 (1981).
As a result, municipal defendants would represent the biggest gap in this Article’s proposed
deterrence regime. Although suits against municipal defendants only account for a small
proportion of damages awarded through constitutional litigation, municipal immunity from
punitive damages should therefore be reconsidered. See supra Section II.A (suggesting
changes to vicarious liability in this context); see also Filarsky v. Delia, 566 U.S. 377, 392
(2012) (holding that qualified immunity applies to all but several narrow categories of nonstate actors).
184. See, e.g., Ngo v. Reno Hilton Resort Corp., 140 F.3d 1299, 1302 (9th Cir.), opinion
amended on denial of reh’g, 156 F.3d 988 (9th Cir. 1998) (“[B]ecause the state of mind
required to prove a Section 1983 violation was as high as that required to sustain a punitive
damage award at common law, a plaintiff who satisfied the former standard necessarily
satisfied the latter.”). But cf. Meltzer, supra note 26, at 277–78 (speculating that the Court’s
criminal constitutional deterrence regime might be explained by the hypothesis that “the Court
is not fully comfortable empowering defendants as private attorneys general to seek remedies
whose primary or exclusive purpose is general deterrence of constitutional violations”).
185. 538 U.S. 408, 425 (2003).
186. But see infra Section IV.E (discussing an incremental approach). Campbell may also
not be an obstacle: it is unclear whether caps on punitive damage ratios should (or do) apply
to all intentional torts, which often result in only nominal damage awards.
187. 549 U.S. 346, 353 (2007); see infra Section IV.E (discussing how it may be possible
to identify the existence of bias by looking beyond the circumstances of the case at issue).
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process concerns—at least to the extent that the legal fiction of individual liability is
maintained in this context.188 For example, exemplary damages would be justified
under this Article’s proposal against an officer using a chokehold pursuant to a biased
chokehold policy, even if bias did not play a role in the individual tortfeasor’s
decision to use the chokehold in question. However, by more formally recognizing
vicarious liability or otherwise ensuring that liability burdens in this context actually
fall on departments and municipalities—while also eliminating the Court’s bar on
punitive damages against municipalities—such due process concerns could be
lessened.189 Alternatively, courts could more consciously tailor § 1988 attorney’s
fees to these underlying deterrence interests: a court might resist awarding attorney’s
fees except when bias, informational problems, or some other factor leads
compensatory damage awards to fall short and then award only partial attorney’s fees
unless deterrence demands a full award.190 Such a use of § 1988 would be consistent
with the statute’s motivating purpose.191
2. Reducing Deterrence Through Diminished Compensatory Damages
The second part of this Article’s proposed reform, the suggestion that
overdeterrence can be combatted through compensatory damage reductions, may
require congressional action to be adopted: although this proposal would satisfy the

188. See Schwartz, supra note 38.
189. See SCHUCK, supra note 42 at 68–70 (arguing for governmental enterprise liability).
Because such changes are consistent with modern tort law’s evolving conception of injury and
responsibility, the Court could adopt them under § 1983. Compare Smith v. Wade, 461 U.S.
30, 34 (1983) (noting that the Court, in its § 1983 jurisprudence, “look[s] first to the common
law of torts (both modern and as of 1871)” (emphasis added)), id. at 34 n.2 (“[I]f the
prevailing view on some point of general tort law had changed substantially in the intervening
century . . . we might be highly reluctant to assume that Congress intended to perpetuate a
now-obsolete doctrine.”), Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 420 (1976) (recognizing a
common-law immunity—prosecutorial immunity—that first came into existence twenty-five
years after § 1983 was enacted), and City of Newport v. Fact Concerts, Inc., 453 U.S. 247,
258–59 (1981) (“[T]he Court’s willingness to recognize certain traditional immunities as
affirmative defenses has not led it to conclude that Congress incorporated all immunities
existing at common law.”), with Buckley v. Fitzsimmons, 509 U.S. 259, 268 (1993) (implying
that the Court can add immunities not recognized in 1871 under § 1983, but that it cannot
abrogate immunities that were well-recognized at that time), and Baude, supra note 8, at 54–
55 & n.43 (noting that “it is the Court’s position now” to look only to “traditional common
law”). If the Court is bound by immunities recognized in 1871, City of Newport v. Fact
Concerts, Inc. recognized that “[b]y the time Congress enacted what is now § 1983, the
immunity of a municipal corporation from punitive damages at common law was not open to
serious question.” 453 U.S. at 247, 259 (1981).
190. One potentially important consequence of relying on tailored attorney’s fees in this
manner is that it would shift the question from one for a jury to one for a judge.
191. See 42 U.S.C. § 1988; S. REP. NO. 94-1011, at 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 6
(1976), as reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 5908, 5913. Another
possible limitation comes from dicta in Ziglar v. Abbasi, where Justice Kennedy noted that
these general sorts of determinations are best left to the legislature. 137 S. Ct. 1843, 1858
(2017).

2021]

THE CONSTITUTIONAL TORT SYSTEM

611

compensatory and deterrence purposes of tort law—especially if redistributed
exemplary damage awards are used to make injured plaintiffs whole—it may
nevertheless fall too far afield of any remedy recognized in the common law to be
adopted by judicial action alone.
As the Supreme Court has repeatedly recognized, to resolve questions about what
types or amounts of damages for § 1983 suits are appropriate, courts should look to
“principles derived from the common law of torts.”192 Although this Article’s
proposed use of exemplary damages to guard against underdeterrence is consistent
with the common law understanding of exemplary damage awards—courts,
including the Supreme Court, have regularly approved similar uses of exemplary
damages193—there is no established corresponding approach to overdeterrence in the
common law.194 As a result, even if it would satisfy the policy aims of § 1983 to
sometimes reduce damage awards to sub-compensatory levels, this is not a part of
the reform that can be unilaterally adopted by the courts.195
Yet ad hoc attempts to limit (and amplify) the effect of constitutional litigation
may already occur throughout the legal system in the form of rights-manipulation.
As Richard Fallon argues, “we should not think of the right to sue . . . for damages
relief as a constant . . . . The availability of a right to sue is as much a variable as
official immunity.”196 As a result, “[t]he definition of rights” may “vary with social
costs,” with courts taking social costs into account in defining the scope and reach of

192. See, e.g., Memphis Cmty. Sch. Dist. v. Stachura, 477 U.S. 299, 305 (1986); see also
Smith v. Wade, 461 U.S. 30, 31 (1983). The Supreme Court has taken this dictate seriously,
starting, and usually ending, its discussion of constitutional tort damages with references to
the Restatements, Prosser on Torts, and other such seminal sources. See also supra note 189;
cf. Carlson v. Green, 446 U.S. 14, 22 (1980) (analogizing Bivens to § 1983 in the context of
exemplary damage awards). Section 1985(3), on the other hand, is not, exactly. See Griffin v.
Breckenridge, 403 U.S. 88, 102 (1971) (noting that § 1985(3)’s invidious intent requirement
ensures that the statute does not become “a general federal tort law”).
193. See, e.g., BMW of N. Am., Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 582 (1996) (acknowledging,
as one permissible justification for punitive damages, the difficulty of detecting an injury);
Perez v. Z Frank Oldsmobile, Inc., 223 F.3d 617, 621 (7th Cir. 2000) (Easterbrook, J.)
(“Frauds often escape detection, and the need to augment deterrence of concealable offenses
is a principal justification of punitive damages.”); Ciraolo v. City of New York, 216 F.3d 236,
244–45 (2d Cir. 2000) (Calabresi, J., concurring) (approving of this use of punitive damages
while noting the roots of tort law’s “multiplier” idea in Gary Becker’s criminal deterrence
scholarship); Kemezy v. Peters, 79 F.3d 33, 35 (7th Cir. 1996) (Posner, C.J.) (“When a tortious
act is concealable, a judgment equal to the harm done by the act will underdeter.”).
194. One statutory response to overdeterrence has been damage caps on compensatory
awards, which do entail reducing compensatory damages to below-compensatory levels in
certain circumstances. Such damage caps, however, have been almost exclusively statutory
and, therefore, should not be considered part of even the modern common law of tort remedies.
See, e.g., Scott DeVito & Andrew Jurs, An Overreaction to A Nonexistent Problem: Empirical
Analysis of Tort Reform from the 1980s to 2000s, 3 STAN. J. COMPLEX LITIG. 62, 69 (2015).
195. See Shaakirrah R. Sanders, Uncapping Compensation in the Gore Punitive Damage
Analysis, 24 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 37, 40 (2015) (noting that “[c]ap-approving courts
hold that legislative authority includes the power to alter common law rights
to compensatory damages”).
196. Fallon, supra note 26, at 965.
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rights.197 In other words, courts may tailor constitutional tort recovery to accomplish
this essential set of goals by limiting or expanding the rights at stake, as they may
already be doing in the context of free exercise.198 If true, this Article’s proposal
would formalize and lend transparency to a practice that has already been adopted,
albeit in an ad hoc manner.
D. Tailored Damages and Qualified Immunity
This Article’s proposal of tailoring damage awards to deterrence addresses,
among other things, the primary policy basis for qualified immunity: the chilling
effect that the stress and stigma of litigation has on desirable state action. As such,
this Article’s proposed reform presents a direct, and potentially preferable,
alternative to the controversial doctrine.
One advantage that this Article’s proposal has over qualified immunity is that its
proportional approach can be more precisely tailored to deterrence and be applied
broadly to counterbalance any factor that gives rise to overdeterrence. This approach
will also result in closer-to-full compensation for victims of constitutional
wrongdoing than will qualified immunity. Even if deterrence-based exemplary
awards from other cases are not used (or are insufficient) to offset reductions in
compensatory damages, because tailored damages entail only reducing
compensatory damages as much as is necessary to counterbalance problematic
influences on deterrence, plaintiffs may still be left with some compensation for their
injuries. On the other hand, because qualified immunity dismisses cases outright, it
will always entail denying plaintiffs any compensatory relief whatsoever.
Moreover, because this Article’s proposal combats overdeterrence via postjudgment relief, it will facilitate the continued development of constitutional law.
This, in turn, will lead to fewer instances in which the constitutionality of a policy or
action remains unclear and, consequently, to fewer instances in which state actors
may reasonably be mistaken about the appropriateness of their actions.199 Qualified
immunity, on the other hand, operates prejudgment, simultaneously discouraging the
development of constitutional law—after Pearson v. Callahan, courts may apply
qualified immunity without resolving the underlying constitutional question200—
while dismissing cases because constitutional law is underdeveloped.201

197. Id. at 967–68; see, e.g., Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 247–48 (1976); Emp’t
Div., Dep’t of Human Res. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 878–79 (1990); see also Daryl J. Levinson,
Rights Essentialism and Remedial Equilibration, 99 COLUM. L. REV. 857, 889–90 (1999)
(labeling this practice “remedial deterrence”).
198. See, e.g., Fallon, supra note 26, at 968.
199. In this very general sense, this Article’s proposal is consistent with James Pfander’s
proposal that plaintiffs should be able to avoid qualified immunity (and facilitate the
development of constitutional law) by challenging conduct for only nominal damages. See
James E. Pfander, Resolving the Qualified Immunity Dilemma: Constitutional Tort Claims for
Nominal Damages, 111 COLUM. L. REV. 1601–28 (2011).
200. 555 U.S. 223, 232 (2009).
201. See, e.g., Aaron L. Nielson & Christopher J. Walker, The New Qualified Immunity,
89 S. CALIF. L. REV. 1, 2 (2015) (showing that Pearson has resulted in some freezing of
constitutional development); see also Jonathan M. Freiman, The Problem of Qualified
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Qualified immunity is not, however, without its advantages. For one, qualified
immunity sets forth a relatively clear standard, at least in theory.202 As a result, state
officials can reasonably predict whether they will be held liable before acting.
Predicting by how much a court will reduce compensatory damages, on the other
hand, is a far more challenging proposition, especially because the whims of
individual judges could lead to some variability in damage award adjustments.203
Although better-developed and defined applications of this Article’s proposal will
help, a system that is inherently ad hoc will be less predictable on an individual basis
than a system defined by a bright-line rule, especially one like qualified immunity
that is geared toward individual decision-making.204 Collectively, though, the
opposite may be true: because individual variations in proportional judgments will
have less of an impact on the overall cost burden to departments than do individual
variations in the strictly dichotomous liability or no liability qualified immunity
decision, this Article’s proposal could lead toward greater institutional cost
predictability—even while it decreases individual-level cost predictability.
An additional potential advantage of qualified immunity is its early applicability,
which, through its forestalling of the burdens of litigation, offers greater protection
against overdeterrence than is available under this Article’s proposal.205 As a result,
if there are categories of cases in which reducing compensatory awards to zero will
still result in too much deterrence, qualified immunity will lead to closer-to-optimal
outcomes. There are two potential responses to this.
First, the Pigouvian subsidy-like reform suggested by this Article need not stop
applying when compensatory damage awards are zeroed out: in circumstances in
which overdeterrence is sufficiently great, defendants could be compensated (again,
potentially funded with redistributed exemplary damage awards) so as to obtain
optimal deterrence.206 For example, an officer forced to endure costly and
embarrassing litigation for alleged wrongdoing who is ultimately vindicated at trial
could be remunerated for his hassle. Somewhat disconcertingly, this approach could
also lead to courts compensating even those officers held liable for constitutional
wrongdoing so as to partially offset the burdens of litigation. Yet, as counterintuitive
as this seems, such a result represents a substantial advantage over qualified
immunity, as it provides a mechanism for negating the overdeterrence effected by
the stigma and inconvenience of litigation in successful cases. For example, efficient
deterrence favors an action that creates $1000 in societal harms and $1500 in societal
benefits. Where, however, such an action will result in a suit that imposes $2000 in
litigation-related burdens on a defendant, compensatory damages could be reduced
to $0 and overdeterrence would nevertheless ensue (because the costs of wrongdoing

Immunity: How Conflating Microeconomics and Law Subverts the Constitution, 34 IDAHO L.
REV. 61, 80 (1997).
202. Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 335, 343, 341 (1986).
203. This predictability problem could be obviated by implementing a statutory system
with clear-cut triggers and automatic damage adjustments.
204. However, as Section II.A indicates, qualified immunity’s emphasis on individuallevel deterrence is likely misplaced.
205. Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 200 (2001).
206. Cf. Fallon, supra note 26, at 940 (“It would be colossally imprudent to furnish damage
remedies to everyone [victimized by some act of constitutional wrongdoing].”).
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to the defendant, $2000, would exceed the benefits of acting, $1500). As perverse as
it would appear to compensate the tortfeasor in this circumstance for her
wrongdoing, if >$500 in compensation is not provided, the costs of acting will
exceed the benefits and overdeterrence will result. Such a compensated tortfeasor
would still be deterred, albeit through the partially offset burdens of litigation.207
If the idea of compensating constitutional wrongdoers is sufficiently unpalatable,
however, another reform could be to preserve the doctrine of qualified immunity in
some form or for some circumstances. For example, as Myriam Gilles has observed,
qualified immunity appears directed toward protecting state actors from negligent
heat-of-the-moment decisions.208 But the doctrine currently applies—at least in
theory—to constitutional wrongdoing that arises from both situationally rushed and
careful decision-making. Limiting qualified immunity to only exigent circumstances
would better tailor the standard’s application to the subset of behaviors most likely
to implicate its underlying concerns.209
Regardless of whether the doctrine of qualified immunity is discarded, limited, or
preserved in whole, this Article’s proposal would be beneficial. This is because there
are circumstances in which qualified immunity does not apply and yet the
nonpecuniary burdens of suits can lead to overdeterrence. And, of course, the
application of qualified immunity does not mitigate (but instead aggravates) the
substantial threat of underdeterrence discussed elsewhere in this Article. In fact, by
winnowing liable parties to only the “the plainly incompetent” and “those who
knowingly violate the law,”210 qualified immunity concentrates liability on those
defendants who are particularly likely to have been influenced by bias or some other
factor that impacts deterrence. The need for deterrence-correcting exemplary
damages is therefore widespread under the current qualified immunity regime.
E. Determining Damages
This Part concludes by discussing one practical obstacle to this Article’s proposal:
the difficulty that courts will face in identifying factors that distort the constitutional
tort system. It will be rare, for example, for an official policymaker explicitly to admit
to the influence of bias in her decision-making. Yet uncovering bias, stress, stigma,
or any other such influence is a necessary prerequisite for a court considering
tailoring damage awards.
Fortunately, many of these effects will be revealed by circumstantial evidence.
There are times at which the broader context of a particular policy will strongly

207. Needless to say, such a policy might appear to reward wrongdoing, in which case it
could lead decision makers to incorrectly appraise the disadvantages of violating the
Constitution.
208. Myriam E. Gilles, In Defense of Making Government Pay: The Deterrent Effect of
Constitutional Tort Remedies, 35 GA. L. REV. 845, 857 (2001).
209. Other alternatives could be to return to the subjective standard in qualified immunity
or to limit qualified immunity’s application to circumstances in which it is necessary to avert
grave injustice or to prevent irremediable overdeterrence. The current doctrine places the
burden on the plaintiff to show that the violated right in question was clearly established. See,
e.g., Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 232 (2009).
210. Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 335, 343, 341 (1986).
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suggest that bias influenced the decision-making in question; it could be fair to apply
a rebuttable presumption of racism throughout much of the Jim Crow South, for
example.211 A similar approach may be useful in evaluating the stress or stigma
burdens of a suit: claims brought under the Takings Clause will generally impose
fewer stigma-related burdens on defendants than claims brought under the Eighth
Amendment; and certain types of cases—claims demanding significant discovery,
for example—are far more likely to give rise to protracted litigation than others.212
Distortions in deterrence caused by problems with uneven enforcement can likewise
be revealed circumstantially: a state without a well-staffed affiliate of the ACLU and
with no other comparable public-interest organization may be able to operate with
more impunity vis-à-vis civil rights violations than a state with numerous NGOs and
plaintiffs-side firms ready and willing to litigate over wrongdoing. Along similar
lines, state-by-state and circuit-by-circuit differences in precedent will render claims
that are nearly guaranteed in one jurisdiction dubious propositions if filed
elsewhere.213 And underdeterrence will result everywhere for certain types of claims
that are universally disfavored—like, following Employment Division, Department
of Human Resources of Oregon v. Smith, a large proportion of claims brought under
the Free Exercise Clause.214

211. For a more recent example of bias influencing decision-making, the DOJ Civil Rights
Division’s 2015 Report on Ferguson revealed widespread “law enforcement practices [that
were] directly shaped and perpetuated by racial bias.” U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, CIVIL RIGHTS
DIV., U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, INVESTIGATION OF THE DIVISION, FERGUSON POLICE DEPARTMENT
70 REPORT (2015), https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/opa/press-releases/attachments
/2015/03/04/ferguson_police_department_report.pdf. More generally, bias is likely to arise in
outgroup policymaking: as a large body of social science research has established, people are
more likely to harbor ill will against or negative stereotypes about groups to which they do not
belong. See, e.g., Jennifer L. Eberhardt, Phillip Atiba Goff, Valerie J. Purdie & Paul G. Davies,
Seeing Black: Race, Crime, and Visual Processing, 87 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 876,
876 (2004) (presenting a study and describing a large body of research “highlight[ing] the
robustness and frequency of [the stereotypic association of Black Americans as violent and
criminal]”); Anthony G. Greenwald & Mahzarin R. Banaji, Implicit Social Cognition:
Attitudes, Self-Esteem, and Stereotypes, 102 PSYCHOL. REV. 4, 11 (1995) (also discussing
implicit biases more generally); Anthony G. Greenwald, Debbie E. McGhee & Jordan L. K.
Schwartz, Measuring Individual Differences in Implicit Cognition: The Implicit Association
Test, 74 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 1464, 1476–77 (1998).
212. Decreasing damage awards due to the stress of the case could perversely incentivize
defense lawyers to unnecessarily draw out cases: by doing so, defense lawyers (who are
typically paid by the hour) will earn more and their clients, if found guilty, will be responsible
for paying less.
213. One recent example of how important jurisdiction can be in constitutional claims is
the recent ACA case, in which litigants filed in the Northern District of Texas, in part because
the district only has one judge, who was thought to be favorable to their claims. Adam Liptak,
Texas’ One-Stop Shopping for Judge in Health Care Case, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 24, 2018),
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/12/24/us/politics/texas-judge-obamacare.html [https://perma
.cc/2FF3-PX8R]. Political effects may also play a role in this. See, e.g., Andreas Broscheid,
Comparing Circuits: Are Some U.S. Courts of Appeals More Liberal or Conservative Than
Others?, 45 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 171, 188–89 (2011).
214. Employment Div., Dep’t of Human Res. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 874 (1990); see also
Lyng v. Nw. Indian Cemetery Protective Ass’n, 485 U.S. 439, 450–51 (1988); Lukumi Babalu
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A number of these problems with deterrence will also result from, and be revealed
by, structural decision-making problems. A police department that has no procedure
for tracking the liability that results from its policymaking, for example, is unlikely
to base its policymaking on correct assessments of that liability.215 Similarly, a
municipality in which damage awards are paid through a general fund and therefore
do not as directly translate into consequences for the liable departments will be more
susceptible to information-based deterrence failures.216 And, somewhat more subtly,
decision makers will be particularly vulnerable to political distortions in the
perceived costs or benefits in question when the population affected by a policy has
little political capital and, therefore, limited ability to exert any direct political
influence on decision makers.217
Basing exemplary damage awards on such circumstantial and structural evidence
will not only help correct for any distorting effects but it will also encourage policy
changes, incentivizing states and municipalities to introduce or improve on
preventative measures to guard against the effects of bias-inducing circumstances.
Identifying the existence of a problem, however, is only half the battle: a court
must also produce some estimate of its effects. To some extent, this is a problem in
the context of private law torts as well, where calculations of emotional distress and
other similarly difficult-to-measure damages are the norm.218 Yet the number of
overlapping effects at play in this context and the particularly high stakes of getting
it right may set constitutional torts apart.
Fortunately, perfection may not be necessary. Because there is no acceptable
amount of influence for biases to exert on constitutional deterrence,219 courts may
continually ratchet up bias-related exemplary damages until there is no longer any
evidence of bias in the department or municipality in question. Take, for example, a
police department beset with indicia of bias that has implemented a policy giving rise
to constitutional wrongs. If a court awards bias-related exemplary damages, one of

Aye, Inc. v. Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 521 (1993).
215. Schwartz, supra note 106, at 1069–70.
216. Schwartz, supra note 102, at 1150.
217. See supra Section II.D; Levinson, supra note 25, at 379. As such, policies that
disproportionately impact politically vulnerable populations are less likely to correctly value
or balance the costs and benefits at stake than policies that disproportionately affect
populations with political influence. And because politically vulnerable populations will often
also be disfavored out-groups, deterrence problems resulting from distortions in the translation
of the costs of litigation will disproportionately coincide with instances in which bias also
influences constitutional deterrence: these effects will aggregate. As described in Section II.D,
however, political-to-economic cost translation issues aren’t exclusive to bias. See supra
Section II.D; see also Levinson, supra note 25, at 348 (stating deterrence problems may
sometimes manifest absent any bias).
218. See, e.g., Mark Geistfeld, Placing A Price on Pain and Suffering: A Method for
Helping Juries Determine Tort Damages for Nonmonetary Injuries, 83 CALIF. L. REV. 773,
775 (1995) (discussing the “inherent difficulties in placing a monetary value on [certain
losses]”); Samuel R. Berger, Court Awarded Attorneys’ Fees: What Is “Reasonable’?, 126 U.
PA. L. REV. 281, 290 (1977) (describing how “[s]ome courts have based the hourly rate
multiplier (which may range as high as 400% of the normal rate)” on amorphous factors like
“the risk of non-recovery”).
219. See supra Section III.B (discussing when bias’s effects are unacceptable).
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three things might happen: the department will make policy changes that fully
mitigate the bias in question, the department will make policy changes that do not
fully mitigate the bias, or the department will make no policy changes. If, in a
subsequent lawsuit against that department, the reviewing court discerns that the bias
in question appears to persist, it would be justified in awarding relatively more
exemplary damages.220 Exemplary damage awards would then be increased in every
subsequent lawsuit until they are sufficient to prompt effective policy change.221
Although attempts to closely tailor damage awards to deterrence in individual
cases could lead to a more rapid perfection of constitutional deterrence, ad hoc
tailoring is not necessary for this approach to succeed. In fact, a fixed damage
multiplier that increases with every subsequent holding that a previous award of
exemplary damages prompted no meaningful change could eventually accomplish
the same goals: such an approach would lead to incremental policy change that
continued until the municipality or department in question implemented a set of
policies that effectively immunized the decision makers in question against bias or
other deterrence problems discussed throughout this article.222
This same approach may not be as promising when bias or some other influences
on deterrence leads to overdeterrence.223 This is because the salve for

220. Because courts lack institutional capacity to undertake this sort of multi-case longterm review, the onus of bringing a failure to adapt could be on the plaintiff litigating. Plaintiffs
have proven adept at this sort of investigatory work—especially when appropriately
financially motivated. See, e.g., Noah Smith-Drelich, Performative Causation, 93 S. CAL. L.
REV. 379, 389–90 (2020) (describing the important investigatory role of plaintiffs’ lawyers).
221. This Article does not take a position as to what specific changes might suffice to
inoculate official decision-making against bias and other such deterrence skews. Much,
however, has been written on this subject. See, e.g., Jerry Kang, Trojan Horses of Race, 118
HARV. L. REV. 1491, 1567 (2005); Jerry Kang & Mahzarin R. Banaji, Fair Measures: A
Behavioral Realist Revision of “Affirmative Action,” 94 CALIF. L. REV. 1063, 1118 (2006);
see also Christine Jolls & Cass R. Sunstein, Debiasing Through Law, 35 J. LEGAL STUD. 199,
202 (2006), available at https://chicagounbound.uchicago.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article
=1157&context=law_and_economics [https://perma.cc/M328-M69E] (focusing on innocuous
biases).
222. See A. Mitchell Polinsky & Steven Shavell, Punitive Damages: An Economic
Analysis, 111 HARV. L. REV. 869, 896 n.69 (1998). For a discussion of how fixed punitive
damages can lead to hyperenforcement, and for a proposal resolving this problem, see Bert I.
Huang, Surprisingly Punitive Damages, 100 VA. L. REV. 1027, 1030 (2014). Given that the
judges and juries examining the existence of bias in official decision-making may themselves
be biased, a fixed incremental approach may also be an attractive option: such an approach
requires only the identification of bias, which may be less vulnerable to the skewing effect of
adjudicator biases than attempts to measure bias.
223. Part of the difficulty is that there may be no way to determine how much policing is
optimal: decreases in policing, even when accompanied by increases in crime, may be a
feature, and not a fault, of constitutional liability. For instance, in the wake of Black Lives
Matter’s emergence as a political movement, there has been some speculation about whether
a “Ferguson effect”—wherein police, fearing post-Ferguson civil or criminal liability, have
taken a relatively timid approach to policing—has contributed to a rise in national homicide
rates. See, e.g., HEATHER MACDONALD, THE WAR ON COPS: HOW THE NEW ATTACK ON LAW
AND ORDER MAKES EVERYONE LESS SAFE (2016); Dara Lind, The “Ferguson effect,” a Theory
That’s Warping the American Crime Debate, Explained, VOX (May 18, 2016, 9:40 AM),
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overdeterrence—reducing the damages awarded—also has the effect of diminishing
a department’s incentive to mitigate the influence in question. This may even give
rise to a negative feedback loop wherein reduced damage awards disincentivize
policies that guard against bias, leading to more bias, leading to further reduced
damage awards.224 As such, there is less leeway in the context of overdeterrence to
use an incremental approach rather than attempting to closely tailor damages to
deterrence.
CONCLUSION
Enforcement and recovery gaps are likely prevalent throughout the constitutional
tort system, especially in the context of the policing or governing of marginalized,
oppressed, or politically powerless communities. This is not, however, a necessary
consequence of the need to ensure effective governance and policing; tailored
damage awards may present a better tool for balancing the competing interests
implicated by constitutional torts.
The usefulness of this Article’s instrumentalist tort-like framework is not
limited to the preceding (admittedly far-reaching) discussion; it also presents a
promising lens for considering and remediating new problems that may arise in
constitutional tort law in the future. Should the Supreme Court decide to revisit its
absolute immunity doctrine for policy reasons, for example, it should do so on these
terms. Protections like prosecutorial immunity are undoubtedly important, but they
come at a real cost. When the Court fails to consider the inherent tradeoffs of its
jurisprudence, it risks creating doctrines like qualified immunity that poorly balance
the interests at stake.
The point of this examination is not, however, to resolve every problem that arises
in the context of constitutional litigation. Instead, this Article seeks, through its
reconstruction of constitutional torts, to lend greater coherence to this confused and
confusing area of the law and to better facilitate the optimal operation of the
constitutional tort system.

https://www.vox.com/2016/5/18/11683594/ferguson-effect-crime-police [https://perma.cc
/7Y8C-32DQ] (describing social science research linking Laquan McDonald’s death to a
decrease in arrests for homicide and non-fatal shootings and to a corresponding increase in
those crimes). Although the “Ferguson effect” is generally described in negative terms, it may
represent a net-beneficial change: a slight increase in crime may simply be the price that
society must pay to diminish the prevalence in officer-involved killings.
224. The difficulty of using incrementalism to combat overdeterrence is one factor that
weighs in favor of a categorical approach, like qualified immunity.

